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WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
The 1909 Act and preceding legislation demanded strict compliance with
the statutory copyright notice requirement.'6 The relaxed standards of the
1976 Act reflects the increasingly relaxed judicial interpretation of the 1909
Act. 165 The 1976 Act further reflects less concern with the threat of monopoly
resulting from copyright protection and more concern for creativity and
individual achievement.:6 With the relaxed notice requirements incorporated
into the 1976 Act and the corresponding judicial sensitivity to the underlying
goal of alerting the innocent infringer, the unit publication doctrine will
become a more frequently applied theory, and as a consequence of the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Koontz v. Jaffarian, the federal courts will refer to the
doctrine by name. 167
FAYE L. FERGUSON
V. EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW
A. Holmes v. Bevilacqua: Establishing a Prima Facie Case of
Discriminatory Promotion Practices
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)l
164. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (discussion of strict judicial application
of statutory notice requirement prior to 1909 Act).
165. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussion of modifications in statutory
notice provisions); supra notes 22-115 and accompanying text (cases illustrating lenient con-
struction of 1909 Act).
166. See supra notes 153-63 and accompanying text (discussing policy underlying statutory
notice requirement).
167. See supra notes 22-115 and accompanying text (review of federal courts' use of
equitable principles to relax statutory notice requirements); supra notes 10-14 and accompanying
text (discussion of evolution of statutory notice requirement); supra note 8 and accompanying
text (naming of unit publication doctrine attributable to Fourth Circuit in Koontz).
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, Pub L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964)(codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (1982)). Congress enacted Title VII to give employees equal
employment opportunities by removing barriers that favor certain identifiable groups of white
employees over other employees. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CoNG. REc. 7247
(1964). By enacting Title VII, Congress did not intend to guarantee a job to every person
regardless of qualifications. Id. at 7247. Title VII does not require an employer to hire an
employee simply because the employee is a member of a protected class. Id. Rather, Title VII
protects an employer's right to require any prospective employee, who is or is not a member
of a protected class, to meet the employer's applicable job qualifications. Id. Indeed, Title
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to achieve equality in the employment arena.2 Title VII prohibits an employer 3
from discriminating against an individual based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.4 Although Title VII prohibits discriminatory em-
ployment practices, a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination bears the
burden of establishing a prima facie case by showing that an employer
treated the plaintiff less favorably because of the employee'sd d race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.' Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
VII's purpose is to promote employment based on an employee's job qualifications rather
than on the basis of race or color. Id.
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; see McDonnell
Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, the United
States Supreme Court stated that Congress' purpose in enacting Title VII was to ease a
plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial employment discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801; see Fekete v. Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331, 336 (3d Cir.
1970)(pointing out purpose of Title VII was to allow plaintiff to establish prima facie case
without difficulty). In enacting Title VII, Congress found that by not allowing an employer
to consider the immutable characteristics of an employee in the employment decision, an
employer would evaluate prospective employees on permissible criteria. See H.R. 7152, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REc. 7247 (discussing purpose of Title VII).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1976 & Supp. 1981)(definition of employer). Title VII
imposes the same standards of compliance on public and private employers. See Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977)(Congress intended equal treatment of public and
private employers); see also H.R. REP. No. 238, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1972
U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 2137 (Title VII applies equally to public and private employers).
Title VII defines public employers as persons engaged in any activity, business or industry in
commerce or in a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce. Id. Title VII defines
private employers as any person engaged in any industry affecting commerce that employs 15
or more people for 20 or more weeks in the current or proceeding year. Id. Under Title VII,
private employers do not include the United States, corporations wholly owned by the United
States, any department or agency of the District of Columbia, Indian tribes, or tax exempt
private membership clubs. Id.
4. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(prohibiting certain discriminatory considerations). Con-
gress granted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) the power to prohibit
discrimination by allowing the EEOC to bring a civil action against an employer or to negotiate
a settlement between the employer and the applicant. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-4(f)(c)(1970),
amended by, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976 & Supp V 1981). Congress amended Title VII in 1972
to enable the EEOC more effectively to enforce Title VII. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92nd
Cong., Ist Sess. 2, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2137, 2138 (1972
amendment increasing enforcement powers). To bring a civil action against an employer under
Title VII, a claimant initially must file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 days of the
alleged discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The EEOC must give notice to the employer
of the alleged discriminatory practice within ten days of the filing date. Id. The EEOC will
conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether reasonable cause exists to believe
that the charge was true. Id. If the EEOC determines that no reasonable cause exists, the
EEOC will dismiss the action and notify the charging party and the employer of the dismissal.
Id. Upon notification of dismissal, the charging party may then bring the Title VII claim
against the employer within 90 days in federal court. Id. at § 2000e-(f)(1). Conversely, if the
EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe that the charged employer engaged in discriminatory
practices, the EEOC will attempt to negotiate a settlement between the parties. Id. at § 2000e-
5(b). If the EEOC is unable to negotiate a settlement, the EEOC will bring a civil action
against the charged employer. Id. at § 2000e(f)(1).
5. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Employment practices can be discriminatory
in several ways. Id. at 802-03. Disparate treatment is one form of employment discrimination.
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case of employment discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to
articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employee's rejection.
6
If the employer demonstrates that there existed nondiscriminatory reasons
for the employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show
that the employer's explanation for the employment action was a pretext
for a racially motivated decision.7 Because of the difficulty of producing
direct or indirect evidence to establish a prima facie case of employment
discrimination, plaintiffs in the early cases under Title VII failed to meet
their initial prima facie burden.8
International Bhd. v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15 (1977). Disparate treatment occurs
when an employer treats an individual less favorably because of the individual's membership
in a protected class. Id. For example, disparate treatment occurs when an employer refuses to
hire an applicant who is otherwise qualified, because of the applicant's membership in a
protected class. Id.; see Akins v. Central Bell Tel. Co., 744 F.2d 1133, 1135 (disparate
treatment occurs if employer treats applicant less favorably because of applicant's membership
in protected class). Disparate impact is another type of discrimination. International Bhd., 431
U.S. at 335. In contrast, disparate impact occurs when an employment practice that is neutral
on its face discriminates in practice against a protected class. Id. For example, disparate impact
occurs when an employment practice, such as employee testing, operates to eliminate members
of a protected class. See Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53
(1981).
6. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802 (discussing effects of plaintiff
satisfying burden of establishing prima facia case); Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981)(employer only required to articulate reason for employment action
which creates question of fact and need not establish by preponderance of evidence that
articulated reason was true motive for employer's action); Board of Trustees of Keene State
College v. Sweeny, 439 U.S. 24 (1978)(employer only must articulate legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for employment action and need not prove lack of discriminatory motive);
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575-76 (1978) (employer's burden is merely to
articulate legitimate considerations for employment decision); see, e.g., Morrison v. Booth,
763 F.2d 1366, 1372 (D.C. Cir.1985)(disciplinary problems constituted legitimate reason for
discharge of black employee); Dybczak v. Tuskegee Inst., 737 F.2d 1524, 1529-30 (11th
Cir.1984)(inability to fulfill contractual responsibility of employment is legitimate nondiscri-
minatory reason for discharge of employee) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985); Johnson v.
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1308 (8th Cir.1983)(poor work record is legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for refusal to promote).
7. See Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs, v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (plaintiff has burden
of rebutting employer's articulation of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring
plaintiff). A plaintiff will win or lose most discriminatory employment practice claims on the
third stage of the burden allocation scheme which requires the plaintiff to establish that the
employer's articulated reason for the employment action is, in fact, a pretext. See Schlei,
EMpLOyumNT PRACTICE D=Rms nAmIoN LAw, 14 (2d ed. 1983)(discussing allocation of burden
of proof in disparate treatment cases). A plaintiff may establish that an employer's proffered
reason for the employment action is a pretext by direct evidence, statistical evidence, or
comparative evidence. Id.; see Slack v. Havins, 11 F.E.P. 27, 28 (S.D.Cal.1973) (evidence of
discrimination lacking); Martin v. Chrysler Corp., 10 F.E.P. 329, 330 (E.D. Mich.
1974)(comparative evidence of discrimination lacking between black and white workers).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964)(prohibiting discriminatory employment practices). The
United States Supreme Court has long realized the difficulty plaintiffs have in showing that
an employer treated the plaintiff less favorably because of the plaintiff's membership in a
protected class. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
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Responding to the difficulty in establishing a prima facie case under
Title VII, the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green,9
created a framework for plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of racial
employment discrimination. 0 Establishing a prima facie case under the
U.S. 321, 328-337 (1977)(discussing Title VII claim of discriminatory employment because of
sex); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-9(1973)(discussing Title VII claim of
discriminatory employment because of national origin); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792,
801-02 (1973)(discussing Title VII claim of discriminatory employment because of race). The
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas attempted to ease the plaintiff's burden by allowing
the plaintiff to satisfy four tests which would establish a prima facie case of employment
discrimination. Id. A plaintiff can also establish a prima facie case of employment discrimi-
nation by direct or indirect evidence. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801. Direct evidence
of an employer's use of impermissible racial considerations in an employment decision includes
bigoted or otherwise discriminatory statements made by the employer. Id. Direct or indirect
evidence, however, is seldom available. Id.; see also Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326
F.Supp. 397, 399 (D. Ore. 1970)(direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory motive is
seldom available and circumstantial evidence may establish prima facie case) aff'd, 492 F.2d
292 (9th Cir. 1974). Direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory motive, however, often
is available in cases involving alleged sexual discrimination. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 508 F.2d 239,258 (3d Cir. 1975)(describing direct evidence of gender discrimination in
employment practices), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975). Direct evidence of an employer's
discriminatory motive is also often available in cases involving age discrimination. See Hodgson
v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 821-22 (5th Cir. 1972)(interview notes requested
employee age fall within certain range). If, however, direct or indirect evidence of employment
discrimination is available, a plaintiff cannot use the McDonnell Douglas test to establish a
prima facie case of employment discrimination. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 105 S.Ct.
613,622 (1985).
9. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
10. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 794-96 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas,
the plaintiff, a black employee, worked for McDonnell Douglas until McDonnell Douglas fired
him from work because of a general reduction in the work force. McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 794. During the period of his unemployment, the plaintiff engaged in an illegal "stall
in," in which the plaintiff blocked the front gates of the McDonnell Douglas factory, and a
"lock in," in which the plaintiff locked McDonnell Douglas employees into a building. Id. at
794-95. The plaintiff engaged in the "stall in" and "lock in" tactics because of his belief that
the layoff was racially motivated. Id. at 794. When McDonnell Douglas decided to rehire
many of the employees that McDonnell Douglas previously had laid off, McDonnell Douglas
refused to rehire the plaintiff because the plaintiff had participated in the illegal "stall in"
and "lock in" activities. Id. at 796. The plaintiff sued McDonnell Douglas claiming that
McDonnell Douglas did not rehire the plaintiff because of his race and involvement in civil
rights activities. Green v. McDonnell Douglas, 390 F.Supp 501, 502 (E.D.Missouri, 1975). The
district court dismissed the plaintiff's discriminatory hiring practice claim because the EEOC
found no evidence of discrimination. Id. at 502. The district court found that McDonnell
Douglas's refusal to rehire the plaintiff was based solely on the plaintiff's participation in the
illegal demonstrations and not on the plaintiff's legitimate civil rights activities. Id. at 502-03
The district court concluded that Title VII did not protect employees against illegal activities
such as the 'stall in" and 'lock in' demonstrations. Id. The defendant appealed. McDonnell
Douglas v. Green, 774 F.2d 636, 637. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that unlawful demonstrations were not
protected activities under Title VII, but reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim relating
to discriminatory hiring practices. Id. at 638-39. The Eighth Circuit in McDonnell Douglas
held that a prior EEOC determination of nondiscrimination did not bar the plaintiff from
1987]
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McDonnell Douglas framework creates a rebuttable presumption that the
employer used impermissible racial considerations in his employment deci-
sion. 1 The McDonnell Douglas framework establishes four tests that a
plaintiff must pass to meet the initial prima facie burden in an employment
discrimination case. 12 The first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test requires
the plaintiff to show that he is a member of a protected class. 3 The second
and third prongs of the McDonnell Douglas test require the plaintiff to
show that he applied and was qualified for the available position. 14 Under
the fourth prong, the open position requirement, the plaintiff must show
that after the employer rejected the plaintiff's application, the employer
continued to accept applications from other candidates for the open posi-
tion. 15
bringing the discriminatory claim in federal court. Id. at 639. To clarify the standards applicable
to establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798. The Supreme Court
noted that the critical issue concerned the order and allocation of proof in a private, individual
suit alleging employment discrimination. Id. at 800. The Supreme Court, therefore, formulated
a test for establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Id. at 802. Under the
McDonnell Douglas test, the United States Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to demonstrate
that McDonnell Douglas's reason for refusing to rehire the plaintiff was merely a pretext for
discriminatory employment practices. Id. at 807; see also infra notes 12-15 and accompanying
text (discussing requirements of prima facie case of racial employment discrimination under
McDonnell Douglas).
11. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (describing effect of establishing prima
facie case under McDonnell Douglas framework).
12. See id. (establishing four requirements of prima facie case if employee cannot prove
employment discrimination by direct or indirect evidence); infra notes 13-15 and accompanying
text (discussing how plaintiff satisfies McDonnell Douglas requirements).
13. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see 42 U.S.C. §1981 (discussing extent of Title
VII protection); supra note 8 accompanying text (Title VII protects people who are members
of certain identifiable classes). The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas was a member of a
protected class because he was black. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801; see Mitchel v.
Badridge, 759 F.2d 80,81 (D.C.Cir. 1985) (plaintiff satisfied first requirement of McDonnell
Douglas test because he was both black and Hispanic); Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,
734 F.2d 1304, 1306 (8th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff satisfied first requirement of McDonnell Douglas
test because plaintiff was black); Muldrew v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 728 F.2d 989,991 (8th
Cir. 1984)(plaintiff satisfied first requirement of McDonnell Douglas test because plaintiff was
black).
14. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (discussing requirements of establishing
prima facie case of racial employment discrimination). The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas
satisfied the second and third prongs of a prima facie case by showing that McDonnell Douglas
sought mechanics and that the plaintiff applied, and was qualified for a position as a mechanic.
Id.; see Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759 F.2d 80, 81 (plaintiff satisfied second and third prongs of
McDonnell Douglas by showing he applied and was qualified for the position of computer
systems analyst); Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys.Inc., 734 F.2d at 1307 (plaintiff satisfied
second and third prongs of McDonnell Douglas by showing he applied and was qualified for
labor position); Muldrew v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 728 F.2d at 991 (same).
15. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (discussing requirements of establishing
prima facie case of racial employment discrimination). The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas
satisfied the fourth prong by showing that the position remained open while McDonnell
Douglas continued to search for mechanics after the plaintiff's rejection. Id.; see, e.g., Mitchell
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Holmes
v. Bevilacqua, 6 sitting en banc, recently deviated from traditional standards
by modifying the open position prong of the McDonnell Douglas test. In
Holmes v. Bevilacqua the Fourth Circuit found that a qualified applicant
seeking to establish a prima facie case of racial employment discrimination
under McDonnell Douglas cannot satisfy the open position prong in situa-
tions in which the employer has filled the position. 7 The Fourth Circuit in
Holmes decided that in situations in which the employer has filled the
position, the plaintiff, after satisfying the first three prongs of McDonnell
Douglas, must present additional evidence of the employer's use of imper-
missible racial considerations to establish a prima facie case.'8
In Holmes, Holmes, a black man, failed to receive a desired promotion
from the position of Assistant Commissioner to the position of Deputy
Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Mental
Health and Mental Retardation. 9 In spite of Holmes' superior qualifications,
Joseph J. Bevilacqua, Commissioner of Mental Health and Mental Retar-
dation, hired Howard Cullum, a white man, to fill the vacant Deputy
Commissioner's position.20 Claiming that Bevilacqua unlawfully had denied
the promotion to Holmes because of Holmes' race in violation of Title VII,
Holmes filed suit against Bevilacqua, individually and in Bevilacqua's official
capacity. 2' Rejecting the Title VII claim, the district court dismissed Holmes'
v. Baldridge, 759 F.2d 80,85 (1985) (plaintiff satisfied fourth requirement of McDonnell
Douglas by showing position remained open after employer rejected plaintiff); Johnson v.
Yellow Freight Sys. Inc., 734 F.2d 1304 (same); MuIdrew v. Anheuser-Busch,Inc., 728 F.2d
989 (same).
16. 390 F.Supp. 501 (E.D. Missouri), rev'd 774 F.2d 636 (1985), rev'd on rehearing, 41
F.E.P. 43 (4th Cir.1986)(en banc).
17. Holmes, 41 F.E.P. at 47.
18. Id.
19. 774 F.2d 636, 637-38 (4th Cir. 1985). In Holmes, many applicants applied for the
position of deputy commissioner Id. at 638. The Mental Health and Mental Retardation
Department found that five applicants, including Holmes and Cullum were qualified. Id. The
Department rated Holmes the third highest qualified applicant. Id. The Department rated
Cullum the fifth highest qualified applicant. Id. Bevllacqua and the employee relations
coordinator interviewed all five applicants. Id. Bevilacqua and the employee relations coordi-
nator asked all five applicants the same four questions. Id. Bevilacqua, however, did not
justify Cullum's promotion based on the four questions asked at the interview. Id. Bevilacqua
justified his choice of Cullum because of Cullum's skill and experience in dealing with
municipalities and local governments. Id.
20. Id. In Holmes, Holmes was a 40 year old black man who held a bachelor's degree
in Sociology, a masters degree in Special Education, and a doctoral degree in Special Education.
Id. In 1981, Holmes began working for the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Department
as the Assistant Commissioner. Id. Prior to becoming Assistant Commissioner, Holmes had
acted as the Southern Regional Director for Mental Retardation Services of Nevada. Id. at
638. Holmes also had authored several articles published in a scholarly journal. Id. Cullum
had never directed a Mental Retardation facility, and had authored no scholarly publications.
Id. The Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation first appointed Cullum as
temporary, part-time Deputy Commissioner to fill the vacancy until the department found a
permanent replacement. Id.
21. Id. at 636.
1987]
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action. 22 The district court held that Holmes failed to establish a prima
facie case because Holmes did not satisfy the open position prong of the
McDonnell Douglas test.2 Holmes appealed the decision of the district court
to the Fourth Circuit.Y On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision
of the district court.
25
After determining that the plaintiff had satisfied the first three prongs,
the Fourth Circuit panel adjusted the open position requirement of the
McDonnell Douglas test for promotion situations. 26 The Fourth Circuit
panel noted that in promotion situations, the position remains open only
until the employer selects an applicant to fill the position. 27 The Fourth
Circuit panel, therefore, concluded that a plaintiff who was denied a
promotion because the employer promoted another applicant, could not
satisfy the open position requirement. 28 The Fourth Circuit panel, therefore,
held that in individual employment discrimination cases involving promotion
situations when the position is filled simultaneously with the rejection of
other candidates, the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test required
22. Id. In Holmes, Holmes testified that in a meeting between Holmes and Bevilacqua
subsequent to the employment decision, Holmes expressed concern that the questions asked
of him in the interview were not the criteria by which Bevilacqua had hired Cullum. Id.
Holmes further testified that Bevilacqua explained to Holmes that the criteria by which
Bevilacqua judged Cullum was Cullum's experience in municipal government and community
affairs. Id. Additionally, Holmes testified that Bevilacqua stated that Bevilacqua's employment
decision was a subjective decision. Id. Testimony also included Holmes' educational background
and experience. Id. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, Bevilacqua made a motion under
FED.R.Crv.P. Rule 41(b) on the grounds that upon the facts and the applicable law Holmes
had no right to relief. Id.; see FED.R.Civ.P. 41(b)(motion to dismiss for failure to state claim
for which relief can be granted). Bevilacqua specifically argued that Holmes had not made
out a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII. Holmes, 724 F.2d at
639. Finding that Holmes failed to establish a prima facie case, the district court in Holmes
granted Bevilacqua's Rule 41(b) motion and dismissed the case. Id.
23. See Holmes, 774 F.2d at 639 (discussing prima facie case requirements). The district
court in Holmes stated that Holmes met the first three requirements of McDonnell Douglas
by showing that he was black, that he applied and was qualified for the position, and that
the employer rejected him. Id. The only question before the district court, therefore, was
whether Holmes satisfied the open position requirement of the McDonnell Douglas test. Id.
The district court found that since Bevilacqua had appointed Cullum to the position, the
position had not remained open, and Holmes had not satisfied the open position requirement.
Id.; see supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing open position prong of McDonnell
Douglas test).
24. Holmes, 774 F.2d at 636.
25. Id. at 639-40.
26. Id. at 639. The Fourth Circuit panel in Holmes found that Holmes had met the first
three requirements of McDonnell Douglas by showing that the employer had not abolished
the position and filled the position with an applicant not a member of a protected class. Id.
at 640. Bevilacqua, however, argued that since he appointed Cullum to the position, the
position did not remain open. Id. Bevilacqua thus contended that Holmes did not meet the
minimum requirements of McDonnell Douglas and, therefore, was not entitled to the pre-
sumption of discrimination. Id. at 639.
27. Holmes, 774 F.2d at 639.
28. Id.
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the plaintiff to establish only that the employer did not abolish the position
for which the plaintiff applied.29 The Fourth Circuit panel in Holmes thus
found that Holmes established a prima facie case of employment discrimi-
nation by satisfying the first three prongs of McDonnell Douglas and by
showing that the employer did not abolish the position. 0 In response to the
panel's adverse ruling, defendant Bevilacqua petitioned the Fourth Circuit
for a rehearing.3
On rehearing, the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc reversed its prior decision
and affirmed the decision of the district court.32 The Fourth Circuit asserted
that the McDonnell Douglas analysis applied to Holmes' disparate treatment
claim. 3  In applying the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the Fourth Circuit
29. Id. The Fourth Circuit majority panel in Holmes contended that the defendant's
interpretation of the open position requirement of the McDonnell Douglas test would be, in
effect, a determination that the McDonnell Douglas test was not applicable in promotion
situations in which the position is filled. Id. Additionally, the Holmes panel contended that
the usefulness of the McDonnell Douglas presumption is limited to cases in which a plaintiff
claiming employment discrimination cannot find direct evidence of employment discrimination.
Id.
30. Id.
31. Holmes, 41 F.E.P. 43, 48 (1986). Either party may suggest a rehearing en bane.
FED. R. APP. P. 35(b). En banc refers to a session of the court in which the entire membership
of the court participates in the decision. BLAcKs LAw DIcTioNARY 684 (5th ed. 1979). Under
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 35(a), a court should not order a rehearing en
bane unless consideration by the full court is necessary to maintain consistency of the court's
decisions. BLAcKs LAw DIcnoNARY 684 (5th ed. 1979). Another reason a court would order
a reheating en bane would be in a situation in which the appeal involves a question of
exceptional importance. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(explaining proceeding and appropriateness
of en bane decisions).
32. Holmes v. Bevilacqua, 41 F.E.P. 43, 47.
33. Id. at 47. Before concluding that the McDonnell Douglas framework applied, the en
bane court in Holmes distinguished the facts of McDonnell Douglas from the facts in the
present case. Id. In McDonnell Douglas, McDonnell Douglas rejected the plaintiff, who applied
for and was qualified for the vacant position, and continued to consider other applicants.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 796. The en banc court in Holmes reasoned that in factual
situations such as McDonnell Douglas in which persons apply for a vacant position and an
employer rejects the applicant before the employer considers all of the applicants, the court
considered significant in establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination that the
plaintiff applied and was qualified for the position. Holmes, 41 F.E.P. at 47. The Holmes
court also considered significant that the employer rejected the plaintiff only to have the job
remain open and later filled by a person not a member of a protected class with similar
qualifications. Id. at 47. The en bane court emphasized that leaving open the position justifies
the presumption of racial discrimination and establishes a prima facie case. Id. The en bane
court in Holmes, however, recognized that the promotion of Cullum and the rejection of
Holmes were simultaneous, and thus, the position had not remained open. Id. After distin-
guishing the facts of McDonnell Douglas and Holmes, the Fourth Circuit en bane majority,
relying on International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, contended that a plaintiff must
show that an employer did not refuse to hire the plaintiff because of insufficient qualifications
or because no vacancy existed. Holmes, 41 F.E.P. at 47; see International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977)(noting purpose of open position requirement).
The Holmes court contended that since Cullum's promotion was simultaneous to the plaintiff's
rejection, the position did not remain open and the plaintiff could not justify a presumption
19871
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found that Holmes had not satisfied the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case of employment discrimination.14 The Holmes court noted
that Holmes had satisfied the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis
by showing that Holmes was a member of a protected class.3 5 The Holmes
court further indicated that Holmes had satisfied the second and third
prongs of the analysis by showing that he had applied and was qualified
for the position of deputy commissioner.3 6 The Fourth Circuit, however,
noted that since Bevilacqua had hired Cullum for the position at the same
time Bevilacqua had rejected Holmes, Holmes had not satisfied the fourth
prong of the McDonnell Douglas test.37 The Fourth Circuit, therefore,
modified the McDonnell Douglas test in cases involving promotion practices
in which the employer filled the position for which the plaintiff had applied
simultaneously with his rejection. 31 In modifying the McDonnell Douglas
test, the Fourth Circuit required the plaintiff to satisfy not only the first
three prongs of McDonnell Douglas, but also required the plaintiff to
present additional evidence of racial employment discrimination. 39 The Holmes
court held that while Holmes had satisfied the first three prongs of Mc-
Donnell Douglas, Holmes had failed to present any direct or additional
evidence of employment discrimination. 4° The Fourth Circuit, therefore,
of discrimination. Id. The Holmes majority further recognized that in Holmes' promotion
situation, the position remained open only until Bevilacqua accepted one of the other qualified
applicants. Id. The Fourth Circuit, however, concluded that the McDonnell Douglas framework
applied in promotion situations, even though the plaintiff could not meet the fourth prong
due to a filling of the position simultaneous with the plaintiff's rejection. Id.
34. Holmes, 41 F.E.P. at 47. The en banc court in Holmes contended that meeting the
first three prongs of the McDonnell Douglas test did not create a presumption of individual
employment discrimination. Id. The Holmes majority contended that Holmes, by not satisfying
the open position requirement, had failed to adduce any evidence of discrimination. Id.; see
infra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's prima facie case burden on
plaintiff).
35. Holmes, 41 F.E.P. at 47; see supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing
definition of protected class under Title VII).
36. Holmes, 41 F.E.P. at 47; see supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing
Holmes' qualifications).
37. Holmes, 41 F.E.P. at 47. The Fourth Circuit en banc majority in Holmes indicated
that without satisfying the open position requirement, an applicant could not establish a prima
facie case of racial employment discrimination by satisfying only the first three McDonnell
Douglas prongs.Id.; see supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's en
banc majority's interpretation of open position prong under McDonnell Douglas).
38. See Holmes, 41 F.E.P. at 47 (determining that modification of McDonnell Douglas
test is necessary in promotion situations in which plaintiff could not satisfy open position
prong of McDonnell Douglas).
39. Id. The en banc court in Holmes stated that in situations in which the plaintiff
cannot meet the open position requirement of McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must adduce
some evidence that an immutable characteristic was a determining factor in the employer's
decision. Id.
40. Id. at 47-48. The en bane court in Holmes noted that Holmes did not present any
direct or indirect evidence of racial employment discrimination concerning Bevilacqua's decision
to promote Cullum and reject Holmes. Id.
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affirmed the district court's dismissal of Holmes' employment discrimination
claim .
4
Although agreeing with the en banc majority regarding the use of the
McDonnell Douglas test in establishing a prima facie case of racial employ-
ment discrimination, the dissent in Holmes asserted that the majority
erroneously concluded that Holmes failed to establish a prima facie case. 42
The dissent contended that the open position requirement of the McDonnell
Douglas test required the plaintiff to establish only that the employer had
not abolished the position for which the plaintiff applied. 43 The dissent did
not require proof that the employer had left the position open.44 The dissent,
however, concluded that even if the majority was correct in requiring Holmes
to present additional evidence of the employer's improper motivation when
the position was no longer open, Holmes had established a prima facie case
of employment discrimination by introducing additional evidence of the
employer's improper motivation. 45 The dissent in Holmes recognized that
Bevilacqua justified the promotion of Cullum based on Cullum's experience
in municipal government and local community affairs. 46 Holmes, however,
had presented evidence that indicated that when Bevilacqua interviewed the
candidates, Bevilacqua did not ask questions relating to experience in
municipal government or local community affairs. 47 The dissent in Holmes,
therefore, concluded that Bevilacqua's claimed criteria for appointment was
suspect.
48
Although the Supreme Court has not considered the merits of a case
involving racial discriminatory promotion practices under McDonnell Doug-
las, several lower courts have addressed cases involving racially discrimi-
natory promotion practices. 49 In Bundy v. Jackson0 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in determining whether
the plaintiff established a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas,
41. Id.
42. See id. at 49 (Winter, J. dissenting) (noting that plaintiff had adduced evidence of
racial employment discrimination).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 48. The Holmes en banc majority and dissent both agreed that Holmes
satisfied the first three prongs of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Id. at 47; id. at 49(Winter,
J. dissenting). Justice Winter's dissent in Holmes, however, disagreed with the majority's
interpretation of the open position requirement. Id. at 49 (Winter, J. dissenting).
45. Holmes, 41 F.E.P. at 49.
46. Id.; supra note 22 (discussing employer's justification of promotion).
47. Holmes, 41 F.E.P. at 49.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Garlington v. St. Anthony Hosp. Ass'n, 792 F.2d 752, 753 (8th Cir.
1986)(racially discriminatory promotion practice established by plaintiff relying on McDonnell
Douglas test to establish inference of discrimination); Monroe v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 784
F.2d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1986)(same); Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc., 773 F.2d 561, 562-63
(4th Cir. 1985)(same); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C.Cir. 1981)(racially discrim-
inatory promotion practice case) infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth
Circuit's express requirements of prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas).
50. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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adjusted the McDonnell Douglas test for promotion cases.-, The District of
Columbia Circuit stated that in a promotion situation, a plaintiff must
establish the first three prongs of the McDonnell Douglas test.12 Additionally,
a plaintiff, to establish a prima facie case, must show that the employer
promoted an employee of similar qualifications who was not a member of
a protected class at the same time the employer denied the plaintiff's request
for promotion.
53
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Bell v.
Bolger,54 considered the requirements of establishing a prima facie case of
disparate treatment under McDonnell Douglas to a promotion case, and
reached a conclusion different from conclusion that the Holmes majority
reached. 5 The Eighth Circuit held in Bell that in a promotion situation in
which a plaintiff has established the first three prongs of the McDonnell
Douglas test but cannot establish the open position requirement because the
position was filled, the plaintiff need only show that although filled, the
employer selected a person not a member of a protected class to fill the
position.5 6 The Eighth Circuit expressly stated that the plaintiff established
51. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C.Cir. 1981). In Bundy v. Jackson, Bundy, a female Vocational
Rehabilitation Specialist with the District of Columbia Department of Corrections applied for
a promotion to a GS-9 position, a position for which she was qualified. Id. at 939-41. Although
Bundy's supervisors informed Bundy that they would make no promotions, Bundy discovered
that the supervisors subsequently promoted others who were not female. Id.
52. Id. at 951. The D.C. Circuit in Bundy contended that for Bundy to establish the
first three prongs of a prima facie case of discrimination, Bundy must prove that she belongs
to a protected group and that she was qualified and applied for a promotion. Id.
53. Id. The Bundy court stated that to meet the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas
test, Bundy must show that she was considered and denied the promotion, and that the
employer promoted other employees who were not members of a protected class at the time
the employer denied the plaintiff's request for a promotion. Id.
54. 708 F.2d 1312, 1315 (8th Cir. 1983). In Bell v. Bolger, Bell, a 43 year old black
security police officer for the Postal Inspection Service applied for the position of Labor
Relations Assistant along with forty other applicants Id. at 1314. A review committee granted
interviews to the seven best qualified applicants. Id. Bell was one of the seven applicants. Id.
The committee individually scored each application and recommended the applicants that
received the top three scores. Id. at 1316-16. Bell received the fifth highest score. Id. The
selection officer ultimately hired a thirty-four year old white male whose application the review
committee had scored highest for the position. Id.
55. Id. at 1315.
56. Id. at 1316-17; The defendant, the Postal Service, in Bell argued that the McDonnell
Douglas test did not apply to promotion situations in which the employer filled the position.
Id. at 1317. The Postal Service contended that after satisfying the first three requirements of
McDonnell Douglas the plaintiff must establish more than the fourth prong of McDonnell
Douglas to establish a prima facie case. Id. The Eighth Circuit in Bell recognized that the
burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment under the McDonnell Douglas
test is not onerous. Id. at 1317 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). The Eighth Circuit concluded
that Bell had adduced evidence that he was a member of two protected classes because Bell
was black and over forty. Id. at 1317. The Eighth Circuit pointed out that Bell was one of
the seven best qualified applicants who had interviewed for the position. Id. Relying on the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia decision in Bundy v. Jackson,
the Eighth Circuit found that the court could modify the fourth requirement of the McDonnell
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a prima facie case when the plaintiff proved that he was a member of a
protected class, that he was qualified for the position, that the employer
rejected him, and that the employer promoted a person not a member of
a protected class to the position.
5 7
The Fourth Circuit's en bane decision in Holmes is inconsistent with the
decisions of circuits that have addressed the application of the McDonnell
Douglas test in promotion situations because the Holmes court, by rigidly
interpreting the open position requirement, increases the plaintiff's burden
of establishing a prima facie case. 8 The Fourth Circuit majority in Holmes
held that a prima facie case of discriminatory promotion practices under
McDonnell Douglas required the plaintiff to present additional evidence of
racial discrimination. 59 By requiring an additional showing of an employer's
use of impermissible racial considerations, the Fourth Circuit en bane
majority increased the plaintiff's burden in establishing a prima facie case
beyond traditional requirements.60 In modifying the elements of a prima
facie case the Fourth Circuit disregarded the purpose underlying the
McDonnell Douglas test by creating a burdensome standard for a plaintiff
seeking to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination. 61 To
justify the burdensome prima facie standard and the rigid modification of
the open position prong, the court in Holmes distinguished between situa-
tions in which several applicants apply and are rejected before the employer
has filled the position and situations in which the employer promoted one
applicant and simultaneously rejected another applicant for the position. 62
The Fourth Circuit en bane court considered significant that in situations
in which several applicants apply and are rejected before the employer has
filled the position, that the employer continued to search for qualified
applicants not a member of a protected class. 63 The Fourth Circuit contended
that the open position requirement justifies the presumption of discrimina-
tion because an employer more likely than not uses impermissible racial
Douglas test and effectuate the purpose of the test. Bell, 798 F.2d at 1315; Bundy, 641 F.2d
at 951.The Eighth Circuit specifically stated that because the Postal Service review committee
rejected Bell for the position and promoted a white male, Bell adduced sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case. Bell, 798 F.2d at 1317.
57. Bell, 783 F.2d at 1317.
58. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (discussing circuit courts that have
used McDonnell Douglas test in promotion situations in which employer simultaneously filled
position and rejected plaintiff).
59. Holmes, 41 F.E.P. at 47.
60. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing purpose behind allowing plaintiff
to establish prima facie case in employment discrimination suits).
61. See Holmes, 41 F.E.P. at 47 (Fourth Circuit's burdensome production standard);
supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (describing Fourth Circuit's en banc requirements
of establishing prima facie case).
62. See Holmes, 41 F.E.P. at 47 ( Holmes majority distinguishing between open position
cases and filled position cases).
63. See id. (Fourth Circuit en banc court in Holmes reasoning pertaining to open position
requirement); supra note 33 (open position and filled position distinction).
1987]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
considerations in an employment decision if the employer rejects a qualified
applicant who is a member of a protected class and then continues to search
for an applicant not a member of a protected class. 4 The Fourth Circuit
en banc majority, however, failed to consider that in promotion situations,
the plaintiff satisfies the presumption of discriminatory purpose of the open
position requirement by showing that the employer did not abolish the
position and filled the position with an applicant not a member of a
protected class.
65
The decisions of circuits that have addressed the problem of applying
the McDonnell Douglas test to promotion situations support the reasoning
of the Fourth Circuit panel and not the en banc decision in Holmes.66 The
Fourth Circuit panel held that in promotion situations, a plaintiff who has
established the first three prongs of the McDonnell Douglas test need only
show that the employer did not abolish the position and promoted a
candidate not a member of a protected class to the position. 67 The Fourth
Circuit panel recognized that the McDonnell Douglas test enabled a plaintiff
to establish a prima facie case of racial employment discrimination when
the plaintiff could not obtain direct or indirect evidence of employment
discrimination.68 Consistent with decisions of other circuits, the Fourth
Circuit panel determined that the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
did not intend the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case to be
difficult.69 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit panel's less stringent standard
for establishing a prima facie case encourages employees to report discrim-
inatory employment practices and discourages employers from using dis-
criminatory employment practices. 70 The Fourth Circuit panel further
recognized that requiring the plaintiff to show only that the employer did
not abolish the position and filled the position with an applicant not a
member of a protected class prevents an employer from asserting that there
existed no vacancy.71 The Fourth Circuit en banc decision, however, deviated
64. Holmes, 41 F.E.P. at 47.
65. See id. (discussing significance of open position requirement); compare with supra
notes 34-40 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit panel's analysis of open position
requirement under McDonnell Douglas).
66. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (discussing circuits that have confronted
problem of establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory promotion practices).
67. Holmes, 774 F.2d at 640.
68. Holmes, 774 F.2d at 638-39.
69. See id. at 639 (discussing plaintiff's burden of production under McDonnell Douglas);
see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (noting plaintiff's burden of production should
not be onerous) supra note 26 (discussing Fourth Circuit panel requirements of establishing a
prima facie case in discriminatory promotion situations).
70. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (describing modifications by Fourth
Circuit en bane court in Holmes establishing additional requirement under McDonnell Douglas);
cf. notes 23-29 and accompanying text (discussing Holmes Fourth Circuit panel's prima facie
requirements under McDonnell Douglas);
71. See Holmes, 774 F.2d at 639 (discussing McDonnell Douglas requirements of estab-
lishing prima facie case of employment discrimination). The United States Supreme Court in
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from the purpose of Title VII and the purpose of McDonnell Douglas test
by ignoring the concerns recognized by the panel. 72
The Holmes decision advises Fourth Circuit attorneys that to establish
a prima facie case of racial employment under Title VII using the McDonnell
Douglas test, the plaintiff, after establishing the first three prongs of the
McDonnell Douglas test, must additionally show in promotion situations in
which the plaintiff cannot meet the open position prong, that an unlawful
racial consideration motivated the employment decision. 73 By favoring em-
ployers, the Fourth Circuit effectively has discouraged employees from
reporting discriminatory employment practices, contrary to the purpose of
the McDonnell Douglas test.74 Congress enacted Title VII to prevent em-
ployers from discriminating against employees on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.7 5 An employees's burden of establishing a




B. Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Company: Has the Dust Settled On
Black Lung Benefit Eligibility
The Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1972 (1972 Amendments) in-
creased the ease with which coal miners could obtain monetary relief for
coal-workers pneumoconiosis (pneumoconiosis) contracted by exposure to
McDonnell Douglas recognized that if an employer could assert that a vacancy did not exist
the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. Id. The plaintiff
could not establish a prima facie case because the plaintiff could not demonstrate that the
employer was accepting applications for the position. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-
03.
72. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (concerns recognized by panel in
Holmes of imposing an onerous prima facie burden on plaintiffs charging employers with
discriminatory practices).
73. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's new
approach in resolving discriminatory claims involving promotion practices).
74. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Title VII and
McDonnell Douglas test).
75. See note 4 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent in enacting Title VII).
76. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (supporting non-burdensome prima facie
case standard).
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coal dust in mine employment.' The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 19692 (the Act) provided the initial compensatory scheme for coal
miners totally disabled by pneumoconiosis.3 The 1972 Amendments added
evidentiary rules, diagnostic standards, and a series of presumptions to the
Act. 4 The amended Act allowed the weight of medical uncertainties to fall
1. Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (1972)
(codified at 30 U.S.C. § 901-945 (1982)). Pneumoconiosis, or Black Lung Disease, is a disease
of the lungs caused by the inhalation of coal dust, usually during coal mine employment.
Drummond Coal Co. v. Freeman, 733 F.2d 1523, 1524 (lth Cir. 1984). Medical authorities
classify pneumoconiosis as simple or complicated. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,
428 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (defining simple and complicated pneumoconiosis). Coal dust alone causes
simple pneumoconiosis, which is characterized by small opacities which appear as shadows or
nodules in the lung fields on a chest x-ray. Usery, 428 U.S. at 7. Complicated pneumoconiosis
is typically a reaction to a combination of dust and other factors and involves progressive
massive fibrosis characterized by larger opacities. Usery, 428 U.S. at 7; see Lapp, A Lawyer's
Medical Guide to Black Lung Litigation, 83 W. VA. L. Rv. 721, 728-44 (1980-81) (providing
detailed explanation of disease, detection of disease, and medical standards).
2. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1982). Congress
amended the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act (the Act) in both 1972 and 1978.
Lopatto, The Federal Black Lung Program: A 1983 Primer, 85 W. VA. L. Rv. 677, 678
(1983). The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 (1978 Amendments) liberalized the claims
award process by adding more presumptions to the Act. Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95
(1977) (enacted March 1, 1978). See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1) (1982) (adjudicators presume
that mine employment caused pneumoconiosis if claimant in mine employment for ten years
of more); 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(2) (1982) (death from respiratory disease together with ten years
coal mine employment raises rebuttable presumption that pneumoconiosis caused death); 30
U.S.C. § 921(c)(3) (1982) (showing complicated pneumoconiosis by x-ray or autopsy raises
irrebuttable presumption of eligibility); 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) (1982) (showing fifteen years
employment in underground mines and totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment
raises rebuttable presumption that pneumoconiosis caused total disability).
Congress amended the Act again in 1981 with the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of
1981 (1981 Amendments). Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95
Stat. 1635 (1981) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 922, 923 (1982)). The 1981 Amendments made
establishing eligibility for benefits more difficult for claimants filing after the January 1, 1982
enactment date. Lopatto, supra, at 677. The 1981 Amendments achieved stricter eligibility
requirements in two ways. Lopatto, supra, at 677. The 1981 Amendments eliminated three
presumptions based in part on length of service. Lopatto, supra, at 677. The 1981 Amendments
deleted presumptions codified at 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(2), (c)(4), (c)(5) (1982). Lopatto, supra,
at 677, 700-01. The 1981 Amendments also deleted a provision of the 1978 Amendments that
prohibited the government from re-evaluating a qualified radiologist's previous positive eval-
uation of a claimant's x-rays. Lopatto, supra, at 702.
3. See Usery, 428 U.S. at 8-10 (defining manner in which Act imparts financial
responsibility for payment of benefits). Total disability under the Act means that pneumocon-
iosis prohibits a miner from working in a job requiring skills similar to the skills that the
miner regularly used in mine employment. See 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(l)(A) (1982) (setting forth
statutory definition of total disability). In 1969, the government estimated that 100,000 miners
required compensation. Lopatto, supra note 2, at 678 & n.9. By the end of 1981, over 520,000
miners, spouses, survivors, and dependents of miners received compensation under the Act.
Lopatto, supra note 2, at 677, 678 & n.9.
4. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 902(f), 921(c)q)-(c)(4) (1982) (codifying particular rebuttable pre-
sumptions for claims filed on or before December 31, 1973). Prior to the enactment of the
Black Lung Amendments of 1972 (1972 Amendments), the Social Security Administration
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favorably on the side of the claimant.5
Congress further amended the Act with the Black Lung Benefits Reform
Act of 1977 (1978 Amendments).6 The 1978 amendments expanded benefits
coverage by instructing the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) to promulgate
criteria designed to liberalize the claims award process.7 The Department of
Labor (D.O.L.) regulations promulgated pursuant to the amended Act entitle
the claimant to raise a presumption of entitlement to benefits., A claimant
invokes a presumption in a two step process. 9 The first step requires the
claimant to show that the claimant worked for a coal mining operation for
at least ten years.' 0 After having shown at least ten years of mine employ-
(S.S.A.) processed all Black Lung Benefits claims filed under the Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 410
(1986) (codification of permanent S.S.A. eligibility criteria). Congress envisioned originally
that after 1973 miners would file claims with approved state workmen's compensation agencies.
See Query, The Black Lung Benefits Act: An Operator's Perspective 83 W. VA. L. Rv. 855,
856-57 (1980-81) (tracking development of Federal Black Lung Benefits Program). The 1972
Amendments, however, shifted responsibility for Black Lung Benefits claims to the Department
of Labor (D.O.L.). See Underhill v. Peabody Coal Co., 687 F.2d 217, 219 (7th Cir. 1982)
(reciting detailed summary of evolution of section 727.203). To facilitate an orderly transition
of claims processing from the S.S.A. to the D.O.L., Congress mandated in the 1972 amend-
ments that the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare adopt the "interim" presumptions
in order to resolve swiftly the massive backlog of claims filed with the S.S.A. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 410.490(a) (1986) (introductory statement to publication of presumptions authorized by 1972
Amendments). Congress intended that the D.O.L. assess all claims under the interim standards
until the D.O.L. promulgated revised standards. See H.R. REP. No. 864, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
16, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmnv. NEws 308, 309 (explanatory statement of
conference committee on 1978 Amendments).
5. See Solomons, Workers Compensation for Occupational Disease Victims: Federal
Standards and Threshold Problems, 41 ALB. L. REv. 195, 196-97 (1977) (discussing certain
aspects of, and continued need for, occupational disease compensation reform).
6. Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No, 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1977)
(enacted March 1, 1978). The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 (1978 Amendments)
required the D.O.L. to adopt new criteria for eligibility that were no more restrictive than the
criteria that the S.S.A. used. See 30 U.S.C. § 902(0(2) (1982) (codifying congressional mandate
to D.O.L. not to promulgate eligibility criteria that is more restrictive than S.S.A. criteria).
The 1978 Amendments attempted to correct a substantial disparity in claims approval rates
between the S.S.A. and the D.O.L. See Solomons, A Critical Analysis of the Legislative
History Surrounding The Black Lung Interim Presumption And A Survey Of Its Unresolved
Issues, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 869, 873-74 & n.14 (1980-81) (citing low D.O.L. claims approval
rate of part C claims).
7. See 30 U.S.C. § 902(0(2) (1982) (Congress mandated that D.O.L. not provide for
more stringent eligibility criteria than S.S.A. criteria).
8. See 20 C.F.R. § 727.203 (1986) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1982)) (codifying
the D.O.L. interim presumption regulation that provides several ways in which to invoke
presumption of eligibility).
9. See 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a) (1986) (delineating criteria claimant must meet to invoke
presumption of eligibility); infra note 11 (quoting text of § 727.203).
10. See 20 C.F.R. § 727.203 (1986) (codifying D.O.L. presumption regulation). See, e.g.,
Alabama By-Products v. Killingsworth, 733 F.2d 1511, 1517 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that
length of mine employment and evidence of pneumoconiosis are conjunctive requirements of
§ 727.203); Frebman, 733 F.2d at 1524-26 (explaining two stage process for invoking pre-
sumption); Underhill, 687 F.2d at 220 (reiterating that section 727.203 provides for invoking
presumption in two step method).
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ment, the claimant must present medical evidence that meets or exceeds the
criteria set forth in the regulations. A claimant who satisfies the require-
ments of the two step process raises a presumption of total disability from
mine related pneumoconiosis and entitlement to Black Lung Benefits. 2 Once
the claimant invokes the presumption, the burden of persuasion shifts to
the challenger to prove a lack of entitlement. 3
The presumption codified at 20 C.F.R. Section 727.203 is one of the
regulations that the D.O.L. promulgated under the 1978 Amendments.
4
Section 727.203(a) provides a procedure by which a claimant may invoke a
11. See 20 C.F.R. § 727.203 (1986) (text of § 727.203). The D.O.L. regulation regarding
the interim presumption provides:
Interim Presumption:
(a) Establishing interim presumption. A miner who engaged in coal mine
employment for at least 10 years will be presumed to be totally disabled due to
pneumoconiosis, or to have been totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis at the time
of death, or death will be presumed to be due to pneumoconiosis, arising out of
that employment, if one of the following requirements is met.
(1) A chest roentgenogram (x-ray), biopsy, or autopsy establishes the existence
of pneumoconiosis;
(2) Ventilatory studies establish the presence of a chronic respiratory or pul-
monary disease as demonstrated by values which are equal to or less than the values
specified in the following table (omitted);
(3) Blood gas studies which demonstrate the presence of an impairment in the
transfer of oxygen from the lung alveoli to the blood as indicated by values which
are equal to or less than the values specified in the following table (omitted);
(4) Other medical evidence, including the documented opinion of a physician
exercising reasoned medical judgment, establishes the presence of a totally disabling
respiratory or pulmonary impairment;
(b) Rebuttal of interim presumption.
In adjudicating a claim under this subpart, all relevant medical evidence shall be
considered. The presumption in paragraph (a) of this section shall be rebutted if:
(1) The evidence establishes that the individual is, in fact, doing his usual coal
mine work or comparable and gainful work; or
(2) In light of all relevant evidence it is established that the individual is able
to do his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work; or
(3) The evidence establishes that the total disability or death of the miner did
not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment; or
(4) The evidence establishes that the miner does not, or did not, have pneu-
moconiosis.
20 C.F.R. § 727.203 (1986).
12. See id. (regulation provides that claimants who successfully meet eligibility criteria
invoke rebuttable presumption).
13. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b) (1986). See, e.g., Usery, 428 U.S. at 38 (Supreme Court
upheld constitutionality of presumption scheme in which presumption explicitly rebuttable by
employer); Bethlehem Mine Corp. v. Massey, 736 F.2d 120, 123 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that
employers must rule out causal link between coal mine employment and total disability);
Peabody Coal Co. v. Lowis, 708 F.2d 266, 268 (7th Cir. 1983) (discussing manner in which
employers may rebut § 727.203 presumption).
14. See supra note 11 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 727.203 (1986)).
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presumption of entitlement to benefits. 15 A claimant who worked as a coal
miner for at least ten years may invoke or trigger the presumption by
presenting evidence that meets or exceeds one or more of four medical
requirements.1 6 If a claimant presents a chest x-ray that establishes the
existence of pneumoconiosis, the claimant invokes the presumption under
subsection (a)(1).' 7 Under subsection (a)(2) the claimant invokes the presump-
tion of entitlement by providing ventilatory studies that establish the presence
of a chronic pulmonary or respiratory disease.' If a claimant with ten or
more years of mine employment introduces blood gas studies that demon-
strate the presence of an oxygen impairment, the claimant invokes the
presumption under subsection (a)(3). 19 A claimant invokes the presumption
under subsection (a)(4) by presenting other medical evidence that establishes
the presence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment. 20
An employer rebuts the presumption under section 727.203(b)(1) if the
employer establishes that the miner continued in his usual coal mine em-
ployment or in work using similar skills.2 1 Under subsection (b)(2) an
employer rebuts the presumption by establishing that the miner is capable
of performing his usual coal mine work or work requiring similar skills.22
Under subsection (b)(3), if the employer establishes that the miner's death
or disability did not arise in whole or in-part from coal mine employment,
the employer rebuts the presumption.23 If the employer is able to establish
15. See 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a) (1986) (providing alternative methods of presenting
evidence of pneumoconiosis to invoke presumption).
16. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)()-(a)(4) (1986).
17. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(1) (1986).
18. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(2) (1986). A ventilatory study measures the ability of an
individual to transport oxygen and carbon dioxide in and out of the lungs. See Peabody, 708
F.2d at 270 (discussing technical aspects of ventilatory testing); Smith & Newman, The Basics
of Federal Black Lung Litigation, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 763, 781 (1981) (reviewing essentials of
Black Lung related medicine). See generally Lapp, A Lawyer's Medical Guide to Black Lung
Litigation, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 721 (1981) (detailed discussion of methodology of ventilatory
studies). A ventilatory study measures forced expiratory volume (FEV), which is the maximum
amount of air that an individual can expel from the lungs in one second. Peabody, 708 F.2d
at 270. A ventilatory study also measures maximum voluntary ventilation (MVV), which is the
amount of air that an individual is able to expel in one minute during a maximum repetitive
respiratory effort. Id. The MVV and FEV values are the values to which section 727.203(a)(2)
refers. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(2) (1986); see supra note 11 (setting forth § 727.203).
19. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(3) (1986). A blood gas study measures an individual's ability
to carry oxygen from the lung's alveoli into the blood. Peabody, 708 F.2d at 271. A blood
gas study tests an arterial blood sample and measures oxygen pressure (PO=2) and carbon
dioxide pressure (PCO =2). Peabody, 708 F.2d at 271. The values assigned oxygen and carbon
dioxide pressure are the values to which subsection 727.203(a)(3) refers. See supra note 11
(reproducing text of § 727.203); see also Smith & Newman, The Basics of Federal Black Lung
Litigation, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 763, 785 (1981) (detailed technical discussion of methodology
of blood gas testing).
20. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(4) (1986).
21. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(1) (1986).
22. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(2) (1986).
23. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(3) (1986).
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that the claimant does not have pneumoconiosis, the employer rebuts the
presumption under subsection (b)(4).
24
While the language in section 727.203 may at first appear unambiguous,
questions arise regarding the evidence that the regulation requires to invoke
the presumption.Y Fourth Circuit decisions do not interpret section 727.203
uniformly. 26 In Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Company,27 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit designated the type and
quantum of proof required to invoke the presumption.21 The Fourth Circuit
also decided what type of evidence employers may use to rebut the pre-
sumption.29
In Stapleton, the Fourth Circuit consolidated the appeals of three sep-
arate decisions of the D.O.L.'s Black Lung Benefits Review Board (Board).3 0
Each of the three Black Lung Benefits claimants attempted to invoke the
presumption under section 727.203(a).31 In one of the three board cases,
Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Company, the claimant attempted to invoke
the presumption under subsections (a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3) by introducing x-
rays, ventilatory studies, and blood gas studies.3 2 In the second case, Ray
v. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., the claimant attempted to invoke the presump-
tion under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) by introducing x-rays and ventilatory
studies.13 Finally, in Mullins Coal Company, Inc. of Virginia v. Cornett,
24. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(4) (1986).
25. See infra notes 126-36 and accompanying text (demonstrating wavering view of
Board on proper interpretation of § 727.203).
26. See, e.g., Whicker v. U.S. Dept. of Labor Benefits Review Board, 733 F.2d 346,
348 (4th Cir. 1984) (A.L.J. must weigh conflicting evidence in invocation stage and that
employers may not rely principally on nonqualifying evidence in rebuttal); Consolidation Coal
Co. v. Sanati, 713 F.2d 480, 481-82 (4th Cir, 1983) (A.L.J. must weigh evidence under
preponderance standard prior to invoking presumption); Hampton v. U.S. Dept. of Labor
Benefits Review Board, 678 F.2d 506, 507-08 (4th Cir. 1982) (A.L.J. must invoke presumption
if claimant presents one piece of qualifying medical evidence).
27. 785 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), cert. granted sub nom. Mullins Coal Co.
v. ,Director, OWCP, 55 U.S.L.W. 3472 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1987) (No. 86-327).
28. Id. at 426-27; see 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(l)-(a)(4) (1986) (listing criteria for invoking
presumptions).
29. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 427; see 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(l)-(b)(4) (1986) (delineating
various methods by which employers may rebut presumption).
30. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 427; see infra notes 31-44 and accompanying text (discussion
of three individual cases consolidated for appeal in Fourth Circuit).
The D.O.L.'s Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (O.W.C.P.) initially processes
benefits claims. Kilcullen, Benefits Under the Federal Black Lung Program, 26 PRAc. LAw
71, 73 (1980), A hearing officer then hears the case and issues decisions and orders. Id.
Claimants may appeal a hearing of officer's decisions to the Black Lung Benefits Review
Board (Board). Id. A claimant may appeal a final order of the Board to the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the circuit where the claimant was last employed. Id.
31. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 428-31 (discussing facts of three cases consolidated for
appeal in Fourth Circuit); see infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text (reviewing three cases
that Stapleton court decided).
32. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 428-30.
33, Id. at 430.
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the claimant attempted to invoke the presumption under subsections (a)(1)-
(a)(4) by introducing x-rays, ventilatory studies, blood gas studies, and the
testimony of physicians2
4
In Stapleton, the Administrative Law Judge (A.L.J.) found that the
claimant successfully invoked the presumption under (a)(1) by introducing
one positive x-ray.35 In Ray, the A.L.J. found that the claimant did not
present evidence entitling the claimant to the presumption.16 The A.L.J. in
Mullins found that the claimant successfully invoked the presumption under
subsections (a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3).17 In the rebuttal stage of Stapleton, the
A.L.J. concluded that medical evidence, including a more recent negative
x-ray, sufficiently rebutted the presumption 5 The A.L.J. in Stapleton,
therefore, denied benefits to the claimant. 39 In Mullins, the A.L.J. deter-
mined that the presumption survived the employer's rebuttal evidence. 40 The
A.L.J. in Mullins awarded benefits to the claimant. 41 In each case, the
Board affirmed the conclusions of the A.L.J.42 Subsequently, each losing
party appealed to the Fourth Circuit. 43 The Fourth Circuit consolidated the
appeals and reviewed the cases en banc.44
In the Fourth Circuit's per curiam opinion, a majority of the court
determined that in order to invoke the presumption under the criteria that
the Secretary enumerated in section 727.203(a), a claimant must present
credible evidence demonstrating that one qualifying x-ray indicates the
presence of pneumoconiosis, 45 that a single qualifying set of ventilatory
studies indicates a chronic respiratory disease,46 that a single qualifying set
of blood gas studies indicates an impairment in the transfer of oxygen to
the lungs,47 or that a single physician's opinion meets the requirements of
section 727.203(a)(4). 4s The Fourth Circuit stated that even if no qualified
physician submitted an opinion, a claimant may invoke the presumption
under subsection (a)(4) if medical evidence other than x-rays, ventilatory
34. Id. at 430-31. Each of the three claimants involved in the Fourth Circuit case worked
in coal mines for at least 10 years. Id. at 428-430. By establishing at least 10 years of mine
employment, the three claimants could raise a presumption of eligibility under any presumption
enumerated in section 727.203(a). 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(1)-(a)(4) (1986).
35. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 429.
36. Id. at 430.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 429.
39. See id. (holding that nonqualifying medical evidence adequately rebutted presumption
under § 727.203 (b)(4)).
40. Id. at 430-31.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 427.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 426 (interpreting § 727.203(a)(1)).
46. See id. (interpreting § 727.203(a)(2)).
47. See id. (discussing § 727.203(a)(3)).
48. See id. (construing § 727.203(a)(4)).
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studies, or blood gas studies establish that the claimant is totally disabled
due to pneumoconiosis.
49
The Fourth Circuit held that in order to determine whether the employer
rebutted the presumption established under section 727.203(a), an A.L.J.
must consider all relevant medical evidence.50 The only limitation that the
Fourth Circuit placed on an adjudicator considering evidence in rebuttal
under section 727.203(b) was that the A.L.J. may not deny benefits because
of a single negative x-ray.5' The court then applied the rules that the court
enunciated in the per curiam opinion to the three fact situations before the
court.5 2 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decisions of the A.L.J. in Stapleton
and Mullins.5 3 The court also found that the A.L.J. in Ray erred by not
invoking the presumption and remanded the case for the A.L.J. to consider
rebuttal evidence.
54
The Fourth Circuit's per curiam opinion consisted of parts of four
individual opinions upon which a majority of the court agreed. 55 Concerning
section 727.203(a), the per curiam opinion reflected in large part the
individual opinion of Judge Hall. 56 Judge Hall asserted in the lead opinion
that to invoke the presumption under section 727.203(a), a claimant need
present only one piece of the specified qualifying medical evidence enum-
erated in section 727.203(a)(l)-(a)(4). 57 Judge Hall stated that a claimant
49. Id. at 427.
50. Id. at 427.
51. See id. at 427 (stating that single x-ray statute was only limitation on court's
consideration of all relevant evidence). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in Stapleton held that § 923(b) of the Federal Mine Safety & Health Act limits a
court's consideration of all relevant evidence by mandating that an adjudicator may not deny
a claim solely on the basis of one negative x-ray. Id.; 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (1982).
The Fourth Circuit also decided the date from which the Act requires the payment of
interest on an award. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 437-39. In Mullins, the Board awarded interest
from the tenth anniversary of the claimant's employment with the company held liable on the
claim. Id. at 431. In reversing the Board's decision on the interest issue, the Fourth Circuit
held that interest accrued thirty days after the agency first awarded benefits. Id. at 439. The
Director of the Office of Worker's Compensation Programs (Director) had ordered that interest
accured from the first award of benefits. Id. at 437-38. The Fourth Circuit agreed that interest
should accrue thirty days from the first award of benefits, and deferred to the Director's view
on the interest issue. Id., at 439.
52. Id. at 427.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 426-27 (per curiam opinion).
56. See id. at 426-27, 431-34 (opinion of Hall, J. on invocation).
57. See id. at 433-34 (holding that claimant satisfies initial burden of proof by introducing
one qualifying piece of medical evidence). Judge Hall rejected the view of Judge Phillips,
which required A.L.J. to weigh all of the evidence before invoking the presumption. Id. at
434. Judge Hall contended that imposing a preponderance of the evidence standard in the
invocation stage required claimants to prove facts that Congress intended courts to presume.
Id. Judge Hall held that requiring a claimant to prove facts intended only to be presumed
made the presumption at least partially irrebuttable. Id. The legislative history surrounding
the presumption makes clear that Congress required the D.O.L. to promulgate a rebuttable
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triggered- the presumption under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(4) when the
claimant produced a single x-ray or physician's opinion.5 1 Judge Hall cited
the use of the word "a" in the language of subsections (a)(1) and (a)(4) to
support a contention that Congress intended to allow claimants to invoke
the presumption by introducing only one piece of qualifying medical evi-
dence.5 9 Judge Hall further contended that the only reasonable interpretation
of the language in subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) required a claimant to
introduce only one set of qualifying ventilatory or blood gas studies. 60 Judge
Hall noted that the mandatory ventilatory and blood gas testing procedures
under the Act required several component tests.6 ' Judge Hall claimed that
the component testing procedure that controlled ventilatory and blood gas
testing assured results of sufficient reliability to justify basing an invocation
of the presumption under subsection (a)(2) or (a)(3) on the results. 62 Judge
Hall differed from the majority in holding that a claimant may not invoke
the presumption under subsection (a)(4) without introducing the opinion of
a qualifying physician. 6
In considering the rebuttal phase of the regulation, Judge Hall spoke
for a majority of the court in stating that after a claimant invoked the
presumption, the burden of proof shifted to the employer to rebut the
presumption. See H.R. Rm. No. 864, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 308, 309-10 (conference report indicated to Secretary that presumption
was not to be irrebuttable).
58. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 433-34 (express terms of § 727.203(a) require that claimants
invoke presumptions under (a)(1) or (a)(4) by presenting one piece of specified evidence). The
Federal Register sets forth the standards for measuring the reliability and authenticity of
medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.101-107 (1986) (citing D.O.L. requirements for devel-
opment of medical evidence); 20 C.F.R. § 727.206 (1986) (citing D.O.L. quality standards
applicable to evidence).
59. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 433-34 (Hall, J., relying on express language of regulation
as evidence of congressional intent); supra note 11 (quoting § 727.203).
60. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 434 (stating that a reasonable interpretation of (a)(2) and
(a)(3) is that claimants invoke presumptions by introducing one set of qualifying test results).
61. Id.; see supra notes 18-19 (describing ventilatory and blood gas testing procedures).
62. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 434. The Fourth Circuit noted that the regulations require
that ventilatory studies consist of several tests along with two or three tracings of each test
and that blood gas studies consist of several phases including at rest and at exercise components.
Id.
63. See id. at 434-35 (physician's opinion is absolute prerequisite to invoking presumption
under § 727.203(a)(4)). But see id. at 426-27 (per curiam court held that claimants may invoke
presumption under § 727.203(a)(4) absent a physician's opinion). Judge Hall advocated a
reversal of Consolidation Coal Co. v. Sanati. Id. at 434; see also Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Sanati, 713 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1983) (case relied on by Phillips, J., to support position on
invocation stage of § 727.203). Judge Hall noted that Sanati held that in order to invoke the
presumptions codified at § 727.203(a)(1)-(a)(4), a claimant must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence all of the facts necessary to establish the presumption. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at
434; see also Sanati, 713 F.2d at 482 (Widener, J., holding that invocation part of § 727.203
required preponderance standard). The Stapleton majority, however, decided not to overrule
Sanati completely. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 427. The Fourth Circuit retained the Sanati standard
for weighing evidence when a claimant attempts to invoke the presumption under § 727.203(a)(4)
in the absence of a qualifying physician's opinion. Id.
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presumption.64 Judge Hall asserted that the adjudicators must weigh the
evidence under a preponderance standard only in the rebuttal stage.65 Under
a preponderance standard an argument or position supported by the greater
weight of the evidence prevails over an argument supported by less con-
vincing evidence. 6
Judge Hall noted that the regulation specifically mandates the consid-
eration of all relevant medical evidence under section 727.203(b). 67 Judge
Hall stated that in the rebuttal stage, the burden of proof shifted to the
employer to disprove by a preponderance of the evidence the causal rela-
tionship between a claimant's mine employment and disability. 68 According
to Judge Hall, a successful rebuttal proves that the claimant does not suffer
from pneumoconiosis, or that the claimant otherwise does not meet the
criteria for obtaining benefits under the Act.6 9 Judge Hall differed from the
majority in advocating the reaffirmance of Whicker v. United States De-
partment of Labor Benefits Review Board.70 In Whicker, the United States
64. Stapleton 785 F.2d at 435. The Stapleton court held that when there is no physician's
opinion, adjudicators must weigh all other medical evidence that may bear on the existence
of total disability due to respiratory or pulmonary impairment. Id. at 466. The types of
medical evidence adjudicators must consider under subsection (a)(4), in the absence of a
physician's opinion, include lung scans, physical examinations, and medical histories. Id. at
466.
65. Id.
66. See Lampe v. Franklin American Trust Co., 96 S.W.2d 710, 723 (Mo. 1936)
(preponderance means that adjudicator finds evidence in support of argument more convincing
and worthy of belief than evidence offered in opposition); see also 9 WialoRn, EVIDEMCE §
2498 Measure of Jury's Persuasion (Chadbourn rev. 1981) (survey of use of preponderance
standard).
67. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 435 (stating that placement of language in rebuttal section
requiring consideration of all relevant evidence is appropriate and consistent with legislative
intent underlying Act).
68. Id.; see Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Massey, 736 F.2d 120, 123 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating
that statutory language makes clear that to rebut presumption, employers must rule out causal
relationship between mine employment and total disability).
69. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 435. Several federal circuit courts agree that after invocation
of a presumption, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption. See, e.g.,
Bethlehem, 736 F.2d at 123-24 (burden is on employer to disprove relationship between mine
employment and total disability); Gibas v. Saginaw Mining Co., 748 F.2d 1112, 1120 (6th Cir.
1984) (anguage of § 727.203(b)(3) relates to burden on employer to rebut presumption), cert.
den., 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Director, O.W.C.P., 748 F.2d 1426, 1430
(10th Cir. 1984) (burden of persuasion as well as burden of production shifts to employer
after claimant triggers presumption); Alabama By-Products v. Killingsworth, 733 F.2d 1511,
1514 (1th Cir. 1984) (burden of proof shifts to employer in rebuttal).
70. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 436; see Whicker v. U.S. Dept. of Labor Benefits Review
Bd., 733 F.2d 346, 348 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that A.L.J.'s unconditional reliance on non-
qualifying blood gas and ventilatory function tests was erroneous). In Whicker v. U.S. Dept.
of Labor Benefits Review Bd., the claimant invoked the presumption under § 727.203(a)(l) by
presenting qualifying x-ray evidence. Whicker, 733 F.2d at 348. Relying principally on non-
qualifying ventilatory and blood gas studies, the A.L.J. in Whicker found that the employer
rebutted the presumption. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Whicker ruled that the A.L.J. erred in
considering nonqualifying test results as the principal means of rebuttal. Id. Because raising
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disallowed the use of non-qualifying
evidence as the principal means of rebuttal. 7 Nonqualifying evidence is
evidence that does not meet any of the necessary criteria for invoking the
presumption set forth in section 727.203 (a)(1)-(a)(4). 72 Judge Hall, however,
found that nonqualifying evidence is particularly relevant in rebuttal when
examining physicians interpret the nonqualifying evidence as part of a
diagnosis.71 Judge Hall concluded that nonqualifying test results are relevant
only as components of the rebuttal evidence.74
Judge Phillips concurred in part and dissented in part from Judge Hall's
opinion.75 The per curiam decision relied on the opinion of Judge Phillips
for the rationale of the court that Judge Hall's opinion did not provide. 76
Judge Phillips posited that in order to invoke the presumption the regulations
required proof of the existence of the specified medical criteria. 77 Judge
Phillips noted the use of the word "establish" in both the invocation and
rebuttal subsections of the regulation.71 Judge Phillips concluded that the
words "establish" and "prove" are synonymous.79 Judge Phillips held that
when the language of section 727.203 uses a form of the word "establish,"
the regulation requires a claimant to prove the existence of qualifying
medical criteria,0 Judge Phillips stated, therefore, that prior to invoking
the presumption, the A.L.J. should measure the medical evidence against a
preponderance standard in order to determine if the claimant proved the
existence of qualifying criteria." Judge Phillips found that section 727.203
the presumption requires a claimant to present evidence supporting the invocation of the
presumption under any § 727.203(a) subsection, the Whicker court partially excluded non-
qualifying test results. Id. Considering the language and purposes of § 727.203, the court held
that forcing claimants to present evidence that supported the invocation of two or more of
the presumptions under § 727.203(a) would be inherently unfair. Id.; see infra notes 90-93
and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's reversal of Whicker).
71. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 436. Judge Hall stated that to overrule Whicker, and allow
the use of nonqualifying tests as the principal means of rebutting the presumption, would
defeat the specific language and purposes of the applicable regulation. Id.; see infra notes
210-12 and accompanying text (examining legislative history underlying § 727.203(b)).
72. See Whicker, 733 F.2d at 348 (defining nonqualifying evidence).
73. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 436.
74. Id. Judge Sprouse fully concurred with the holdings and rationale of Judge Hall;
See id. at 449 (Sprouse, J., joined by Winter, Hall and Sneeden, J.J.).
75. Id. at 439 (Phillips, J., joined by Russell, Murnaghan, and Ervin, J.J.).
76. See id. at 426-27 (per curiam opinion).
77. Id. at 441.
78. Id. at 443.
79. See id. (Phillips, J., asserting that word "establish," in common usage, indicates
burden of persuasion rather than burden of production).
80. Id. at 441. Judge Phillips asserted that absent an expressed standard of proof in the
regulation, a preponderance standard is the correct standard to apply. Id. at 443 n.6. Judge
Phillips found that there existed no express standard of proof in section 727.203. Id. Judge
Phillips, therefore, concluded that to establish a prima facie case of compensable disability,
claimants must prove the existence of the elements of the presumption by a preponderance of
the evidence. Id. at 441, 443 & n.6.
81. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 441.
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contained a passage mandating the consideration of all relevant evidence in
adjudicating claims.82 Judge Phillips further found that the section 727.203
mandate to consider all relevant evidence applied to the entire presumption
regulation, including the invocation subsection. 3 Moreover, Judge Phillips
stated that the failure to consider relevant evidence in the invocation stage
would exclude evidence that may bear on the merit and validity of benefits
claims .
84
Judge Phillips stated that after invoking the presumption, the burden of
persuasion regarding disproving eligibility, measured against a preponder-
ance standard, shifts to the party opposing the claim.s5 Judge Phillips,
however, dissented on the issue of which specific facts the rebuttal evidence
may disprove.6 Judge Phillips found that rebuttal evidence may not disprove
a fact that a claimant proved in the invocation stage.8 7 For example, Judge
Phillips held that to invoke the presumption under subsection (a)(1), a
claimant must prove by a preponderance of the x-ray evidence that the
claimant suffers from pneumoconiosis.88 Judge Phillips would allow an
employer to rebut the presumption established under subsection (a)(1) under
any 727.203(b) subsection except subsection (b)(4), which requires evidence
establishing that the claimant does not have pneumoconiosis.89
82. See id. at 443 (Director's interpretation requiring assessment of all relevant evidence
in invocation stage finds support in plain words of § 727.203).
83. See id. (asserting that mandate to consider all relevant evidence applies to entire
regulation, including both invocation and rebuttal sections). Judge Hall contended that adju-
dicators must weigh evidence under a preponderance standard only in the rebuttal stage because
the specific words mandating the consideration of all relevant evidence appear in section
727.203(b). Id. at 435.
84. Id. at 449.
85. See id. at 441 (Judge Phillips stating that employer's burden of proof in rebuttal is
to negate elements of disability claim that claimant did not prove in invoking presumption).
86. See id. (Judge Phillips holding that employers may not negate elements of a claim
that claimant proved by preponderance of evidence in invocation stage).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 446; see supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (Judge Phillips stated that
§ 727.203(a) requires claimants to prove, by preponderance of evidence, facts necessary to
invoke presumption).
89. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 441. Judge Phillips concluded that specific relationships existed
between presumption and rebuttal. Id. at 447-48. If a claimant invokes the presumption under
subsection (a)(1), the claimant has proved that he has pneumoconiosis, and raised a rebuttable
presumption that the pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment and that pneumo-
coniosis totally disabled the claimant. Id. If a claimant invokes the presumption under
subsection (a)(2) or (a)(3), the claimant has proved that he has a respiratory or pulmonary
problem, and raises the rebuttable presumption that pneumoconiosis caused the respiratory or
pulmonary problem, that the pneumoconiosis arose from mine employment, and that the
disease is totally disabling. Id. at 448. A claimant invoking the presumption under § 727.203(a)(4)
proved that a respiratory or pulmonary problem caused total disability and raised a rebuttable
presumption that pneumoconiosis arose from mine employment and caused the respiratory or
pulmonary problem. Id.
Judge Phillips further held that to invoke the presumption under (a)(4), the claimant
must prove total disability. Id. Judge Phillips also held that rebuttal under (b)(1) requires
[Vol. 44:505
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIEW
Judge Phillips spoke for the majority on the issue of the use of
nonqualifying evidence in rebuttal90 Judge Phillips noted that allowing the
introduction of all relevant evidence gave employers fair opportunity to
prove that the claimant's pneumoconiosis was not totally disabling. 91 Judge
Phillips noted that the language of section 727.203 expressly directed courts
to consider all relevant evidence. 92 Judge Phillips stated that a rule excluding
nonqualifying evidence would prevent employers from presenting probative
evidence concerning presumed facts of causation and total disability. 93
In arriving at a decision, Judge Phillips asserted that he was deferring
to the interpretation of the Director of the Office of Workers Compensation
employers to prove that a claimant does or is able to do his usual coal mine work, or
comparable work. Id. Judge Phillips, therefore, would not allow employers to rebut the
presumption invoked under subsection (a)(4) by proving a (b)(1) rebuttal. Id.
90. See id. at 427 (per curiam opinion).
91. Id. at 446-47. Judge Phillips would overrule two decisions of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Whicker and Hampton v. U.S. Dept. of Benefits Review
Bd. Id. Whicker v. U.S. Dept. of Labor Benefits Review Bd., 733 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1984);
Hampton v. U.S. Dept. of Benefits Review Bd., 678 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1982). Judge Phillips
would overrule Whicker and Hampton to the extent that the decisions did not allow an A.L.J.
to consider nonqualifying evidence in the rebuttal stage. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 446-47
(Judge Phillips held that Whicker and Hampton violated statutory mandate to consider all
relevant evidence); see also Whicker, 733 F.2d at 348 (A.L.J. cannot use nonqualifying test
results to rebut legitimately invoked presumption); Hampton v. U.S. Dept. of Benefits Review
Bd., 678 F.2d 506, 507-508 (4th Cir. 1982) (claimant does not have to present evidence to
invoke presumption under other subsections once claimant raises presumption under one
subsection). Judge Phillips contended that the holdings in Whicker and Hampton were contrary
to the statutory mandate of 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) which states that employers may not rebut
the presumption on the basis of a single negative x-ray. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 446; see 30
U.S.C. § 923(b) (codification of single x-ray statute, mandating circumstances under which
Secretary must accept radiologist's interpretation of claimant's chest roentgenogram).
92. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 446.
93. Id. Judge Phillips concluded that the language of section 727.203 supplied no basis
for excluding nonqualifying evidence, even if employers used nonqualifying evidence as the
principal means of rebuttal. Id.
Judge Widener concurred and dissented from the opinion of Judge Hall. See id. at 465
(opinion of Widener, J., joined by Chapman, Wilkinson, J.J.). Judge Widener agreed that a
claimant may invoke the presumption under subsections (a)(l)-(a)(3) by producing one qualifying
piece of evidence. See id. (recognizing that production of one qualifying x-ray, blood gas, or
ventilatory study is sufficient to invoke presumption under subsections (a)(l)-(a)(3)). Judge
Widener held that imposing a preponderance standard in the invocation stage would require
a double evaluation of identical evidence under the same standard. Id. Judge Widener stated
that an A.L.J. first would evaluate the evidence under section 727.203(a) in the invocation
stage. Id. Judge Widener found that Judge Phillips' view on invocation would require a second
evaluation of the evidence under section 727.203(b) in the rebuttal stage. Id. Judge Widener
held that in the absence of a physician's documented opinion, an A.L.J. should weigh under
a preponderance of the evidence standard any other relevant medical evidence, in order to
determine if the evidence established the presumption under (a)(4). Id.
In the rebuttal stage, Judge Widener would allow a court to consider relevant evidence,
whether the evidence is qualifying or nonqualifying. Id. at 466-67. Judge Widener stated that
the language of the statute requires that a court consider all relevant evidence regardless of
the weight that the evidence may carry. See id. (contending that there exists no reason to
impose artificial restrictions on availability of evidence in claims adjudications).
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Programs (Director) regarding section 727.203. 94 Judicial deference to an
agency's interpretation of an agency regulation was thus a major issue in
the Fourth Circuit's decision. 95 Specifically, the court considered whether
the deference rule required the Fourth Circuit to defer to the Director's
interpretation of section 727.203.96 The first issue that the Fourth Circuit
addressed regarding the deference question concerned whether section
727.203(a) required the court to weigh all relevant evidence against a
preponderance standard prior to invoking a presumption. 97 A second issue
concerned the court's use of nonqualifying test results in the rebuttal stage
of section 727.203.98
Interpretations by agencies of agency regulations generally are preferable
to judicial interpretations." Courts lack specialized experience and expertise
that agencies possess.'0 Blind adherence to agency interpretations, however,
creates several obvious problems. 01 If courts blindly adhered to agency
interpretations, there would exist no barriers to agencies changing interpre-
tations at any time.c22 Judicial adherence to agencies' changing interpreta-
94. Id. at 440; see supra note 30 (examining procedure D.O.L. employs to adjudicate
Black Lung Benefits claims).
95. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 440 (Judges Sprouse and Phillips examining deference
issue). The deference rule refers to the practice by which courts defer to an administrative
agency's construction of governing statutes and regulations. See Weaver, Judicial Interpretation
of Administrative Regulations: The Deference Rule, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 587, 587 (1984)
(examining agency interpretations of agency regulations).
96. See Stapleton, 785 F,2d at 439-64 (individual opinions of Judges Phillips and Sprouse).
The Fourth Circuit confined to the opinions of Judges Phillips and Sprouse extensive discussion
of substantive Administrative Law issues. Id. Judge Sprouse, who fully concurred with the
opinion of Judge Hall, wrote separately only to respond to the opinion of Judge Phillips. Id.
at 449.
97. Id. at 426-27; see supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth
Circuit's opinion on operation of §§ 727.203(a)(l)-(a)(4)).
98. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 427; see supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (Fourth
Circuit's decision on proper use of relevant evidence in rebuttal); Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 445
(Judge Phillips identified invocation issue and use of nonqualifying evidence in rebuttal issue
as areas of critical conflict between Judge Hall and Director in interpreting § 727.203).
99. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 95, at 587 & n.4 (1984) (citing support for theory that
principal reason for judicial deference to agency interpretations is expertise of agencies in
specific areas); Levin & Woodward, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 31 AD. L. REv. 329, 330 (1979) (courts determine required degree of deference after
considering agency's technical knowledge and experience); DAvis, 5 ADmNmsTRATvE LAW §
29:13 (2d ed. 1984) (reviewing recent Supreme Court decisions involving deference to agency
interpretations).
100. See supra note 99 (citing importance of agency expertise in determining degree of
deference court required to accord agency interpretations of regulations).
101. See Weaver, supra note 95, at 611-23 (citing positive and negative aspects of deference
to agency interpretations).
102. See id. at 612-13 (discussing effect of changing political philosophies on agencies'
interpretations). A further problem contributing to shifting agency interpretations is that
agencies continually apply increased expertise and knowledge to agency operations. Id. New
expertise may change the way an agency interprets a regulation. Id. An additional problem is
that despite an agency's expertise, the agency's interpretation may be wrong. Id.
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tions of regulations would detract from reliability and predictability in the
law. 103 If courts adhered to any agency interpretation of a regulation, the
executive branch would have a perfect vehicle by which to assert indirect
control over administrative policy.1 4 Agencies could reflect each new admin-
istration's policies simply by changing interpretations of regulations, rather
than by rescinding or amending the regulations. 105 Changing personnel could
subject the interpretations of regulations to change based on personal
biases.31 Each revised interpretation would erode further the intent of the
original promulgators of a regulation.3 7
Congress endowed the Social Security Administration (S.S.A.) and the
D.O.L. with authority to implement fully the legislative intent underlying
the Act. 08 The S.S.A. and the D.O.L. attempted to implement congressional
intent by promulgating regulations.3 9 One of the regulations that the D.O.L.
103. Id. The unpredictability that changing agency interpretations creates encourages
litigation. Id.; see generally Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 CoLUM. L.
Rnv. 1, 3 n.18 (discussing problem of courts tailoring decisions involving applications of
deference rule to reach desired result).
104. See Weaver, supra note 95, at 612-13 (citing examples of politically altered interpre-
tations of administrative regulations).
105. Weaver, supra note 95, at 613 n.147. There exists evidence indicating that adminis-
trative imposition of policy through changes in interpretations already has occurred. Id.; see
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 577-85 (1983) (suit to strip University of tax
exempt status because of University's racially discriminatory policies). In Bob Jones University
v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld an Internal
Revenue Service (I.R.S.) decision to revoke Bob Jones University's tax exempt status. Bob
Jones, 461 U.S. at 582, 584. The I.R.S. interpreted a tax exemption provision of the Internal
Revenue Code as not allowing a school that practiced discrimination to maintain tax exempt
status. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 578. Prior to the I.R.S. ruling, the I.R.S. considered the
provision as granting tax exempt status to certain schools despite the schools' racially discrim-
inatory policies. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 577-78. The United States Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the Fourth Circuit and the interpretation of the I.R.S. See Bob Jones, 461
U.S. at 609 (Court held that University was not tax exempt organization under I.R.S. provision
because University did not serve or harmonize demonstrably with public interest). Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision, however, the Reagan Administration changed the position of the
Executive Branch on the tax exempt issue. Weaver, supra note 95, at 613 n.147. The Reagan
Administration insisted that the I.R.S. Code provision did not allow the I.R.S. discretion to
deny tax exempt status based on the racially discriminatory policy of the taxpayer. Weaver,
supra note 95, at 613 n.147.
106. See Weaver, supra note 95 at 613 (stating that political considerations may cause
agencies to alter interpretations of regulations).
107. See id. at 611-15 (suggesting that deference standards do not allow courts to protect
adequately against agencies' effectively amending regulations by changing interpretation).
108. See 30 U.S.C. § 902(0(2) (1982) (directing Secretary of Labor to adopt criteria no
more restrictive than criteria of Social Security Administration regarding establishing eligibility
for Black Lung Benefits); infra note 211 (discussing legislative mandate for D.O.L. eligibility
criteria that was no more restrictive than criteria of S.S.A.).
109. See Oversight of the Administration of the Black Lung Program, 1977: Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 49 (1977) (legislative history of § 727.203); Hearings on H.R. 3476, H.R. 8834, H.R.
8838 Before the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and
Labor, 93rd Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 329, 341, 349, 399 (1973-1974) (discussing establishing a
presumption applicable to Part C claims).
1987]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
promulgated pursuant to congressional authority is section 727.203.110 Con-
gress decided that the S.S.A. and the D.O.L. possessed the necessary
expertise to promulgate regulations that balance the legal and medical issues
arising in the typical Black Lung case."' The Fourth Circuit faced the
question of whether, and to what extent, a court must give deference to an
agency interpretation.1
2
A preliminary issue that the Fourth Circuit did not resolve fully was
whether the D.O.L. consistently had applied the Director's interpretation
of section 727.203."1 The Director submitted a brief to the Fourth Circuit
that set forth the interpretation of section 727.203 on which Judge Phillips
relied." 4 Prior to Stapleton, the Director never had expressed formally an
interpretation of section 727.203."1 Judge Sprouse, in an individual opinion,
asserted that there existed no affirmative evidence in the Director's brief
indicating that the D.O.L. reasonably and consistently had applied the
Director's interpretation of section 727.203.116 Judge Sprouse, however,
failed to reveal evidence to support the claim that the D.O.L. had not
110. Hearings on H.R. 3476, H.R. 8834, H.R. 8838 Before the General Subcommittee on
Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 93rd Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 329,
341 349,399 (1973-74); see supra note II (setting forth text of § 727.203).
111. See S. 2917, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 501 (1977), reprinted in Legislative History of
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1963-64 and Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act: Hearings on Black Lung Benefits Provisions Before the H.
Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 275 (1977) (explaining reasons for
assigning agency task of administering Black Lung Benefit Program).
112. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 439-40, 449 (opinions of Phillips and Sprouse, J.J.). The
dispute in Stapleton concerned whether or not to apply the deference rule. Id. The Fourth
Circuit has applied the deference principle in certain cases. See, e.g., Motley v. Heckler, 800
F.2d 1253, 1254 (4th Cir. 1986) (agency entrusted with implementing statutory scheme is
entitled to substantial deference); Starrett v. Special Counsel, 792 F.2d 1246, 1252 (4th Cir.
1986) (although deference to agency interpretations is required at times, blind adherence to
every agency interpretation is not); Dixon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 1176, 1181
(4th Cir. 1986) (considerable deference due an agency's interpretation of a statute that Congress
charges agency with implementing).
113. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 440 n.1 (discussing whether to consider Director's
interpretation of § 727.203 as consistently applied agency interpretation); id. at 449 (Judge
Hall rejecting Director's interpretation of 727.203 because Director did not show interpretation
was consistently applied interpretation of agency).
114. See id. at 432 (Director's brief supported argument that claimants must invoke
presumption by proving elements by preponderance of evidence). The Director of the Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs (O.W.C.P.) intervened in Stapleton in order to present
and defend the Director's interpretation of section 727.203. Id. at 440 n.l.
115. Id. at 440 n.l. Prior to Stapleton, the Director had published no interpretation of
section 727.203. Id. The Stapleton court, therefore, could refer to no interpretation of §
727.203 of the Director's that was inconsistent with the interpretation that the Director
introduced to the Fourth Circuit. Id.
116. Id. Judge Sprouse implied that the Director needed to assert that the D.O.L. had
reasonably and consistently applied the interpretation before the Fourth Circuit could defer to
the interpretation. Id. at 449-50. Judge Sprouse, finding no assertion of the D.O.L.'s reasonable
and consistent application of the Director's interpretation, would not require the court to
adhere to the Director's interpretation. Id.
[Vol. 44:505
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
applied consistently the Director's interpretation.' 17 Similarly, Judge Phillips
alluded to no affirmative evidence to refute Judge Sprouse's contention that
the D.O.L. did not apply reasonably and consistently the Director's inter-
pretation." 8 Invoking the presumption under the Director's interpretation
of section 727.203(a) is more difficult than invoking the presumption under
the Fourth Circuit's interpretation." 9 Under the Director's interpretation, a
claimant bears the burden of persuasion to prove the existence of the
qualifying medical criteria specified in section 727.203(a)()-(a)(4). 120 The
Fourth Circuit's interpretation requires the claimant to bear only a burden
of production to introduce at least one piece of qualifying medical evidence
delineated in section 727.203(a)(l)-(a)(4).' 21 The most recent amendment to
the Act highlights the need to examine the consistency of the D.O.L's
application of the Director's interpretation.'2 The 1981 amendment to the
Act made establishing Black Lung Benefits eligibility more difficult.' 3 The
Director's interpretation is consistent with the goals of the 1981 Amend-
ment. 2 4 The Director's introduction of an interpretation of section 727.203
warranted a more thorough effort by the court to determine whether the
D.O.L. consistently had applied the Director's interpretation.1 5
Logically, reviewing past Board decisions involving the interpretation of
section 727.203 should enable courts to determine the interpretation of the
regulation consistently applied by the D.O.L. 2 6 The Board, however, has
applied conflicting interpretations of section 727.203.127 In Consolidation
Coal Company v. Sanati,128 for example, the Board affirmed an express
117. See id. (Judge Sprouse relied on Director's failure to present evidence showing that
agency consistently applied Director's interpretation of § 727.203 to hold that Fourth Circuit
owed no deference to interpretation).
118. See id. at 440 n.l. (Judge Phillips relied on Director's interpretation of § 727.203
because Director's interpretation was only one available to court).
119. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text (explaining how Director's interpre-
tation of § 727.203(a) makes invoking presumption more difficult than invoking presumption
under per curiam position).
120. See Brief for the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs at 15-18,
Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 785 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1986) (Director advocated placing
burden of persuasion, rather than burden of production, on claimant in invocation stage).
121. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 426-27 (per curiam opinion of Fourth Circuit).
122. Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97119, 95 Stat. 1635 (1981)
(codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 922, 923 (1982)); see supra note 2 (discussing provisions of 1981
Amendments).
123. See Note, Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981: Transfer of Special Claims
Under Section 205, 86 W. VA. L. Rav. 1023, 1026-1028 (1983-84) (reviewing legislative history
and underlying intent of 1981 Amendments).
124. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text (citing failure of court to resolve
whether D.O.L. consistently applied Director's interpretation of § 727.203).
125. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text (alluding to importance of Board's
striving to maintain consistency in the application of regulations).
126. See infra notes 128-136 and accompanying text (citing examples of Board decision
inconsistencies regarding correct operation of § 727.203).
127. Id.
128. 713 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1983).
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A.L.J. ruling.l29 The A.L.J. in Sanati specifically held that an A.L.J. may
not weigh evidence in the invocation stage. 30 More specifically, the A.L.J.
held that introducing one qualifying piece of medical evidence set forth in
subsections (a)(l)-(a)(4) was sufficient to invoke the presumption.' 3' In other
cases, however, the Board affirmed A.L.J. rulings contrary to the Board's
holding in Sanati.32 For example, in Strako v. Ziegler Coal Company,
3
the Board concluded that before invoking the presumption under subsection
(a)(2), the A.L.J. must weigh all of the evidence. 3 4 In Sanati, the Board
required only one piece of qualifying medical evidence to invoke the
presumption, while in Strako the Board required A.L.J.'s to weigh the
medical evidence prior to invoking the presumption. 135 The Board's decisions
do not reflect the consistent application of any single interpretation.
36
The Fourth Circuit, after briefly considering whether the D.O.L. con-
sistently applied the Director's interpretation, analyzed standards of judicial
review regarding agency interpretations of regulations. 37 The standards
under which courts review agency interpretations vary widely.' 3 Many cases
129. Sanati, 713 F.2d at 481.
130. Id.
131. Id. In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Sanati, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit recognized that the medical evidence included conflicting x-rays and ventilatory
and blood gas studies, as well as conflicting physicians' opinions. Id. The A.L.J. invoked the
presumption under § 727.203(a)(4) on the strength of a physician's opinion that pneumoconiosis
had disabled the claimant. Id. The Board affirmed the A.L.J. Id. at 482. The Fourth Circuit,
however, reversed the Board. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Sanati ruled that an A.L.J. must
weigh in the invocation stage all of the evidence concerning a fact necessary to establish the
presumption. Id. Compare Sharpless v. Califano, 585 F.2d 664, 667 (4th Cir. 1978) (Fourth
Circuit affirmed Board opinion that preponderance standard applied in invocation stage); Petry
v. Califano, 577 F.2d 860, 864 (4th Cir. 1978) (Fourth Circuit, affirming Board, holding that
claimant must prove facts necessary to invoke presumption by preponderance of evidence)
with Stiner v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 3 Black Lung Rep. 1-487 (1981) (Board rejected
preponderance standard in invocation stage).
132. See Justice v. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., 3 Black Lung Rep. 1-547 (1981) (holding
that before invoking the presumption under subsection (a)(1), A.L.J. must weigh results of all
x-ray readings).
133. 3 Black Lung Rep. 1-136 (1981).
134. Strako v. Ziegler Coal Company, 3 Black Lung Rep. 1-136, 1-143 (1981). The A.L.J.
must weigh the evidence in the invocation stage and determine whether the weight of the
qualifying ventilatory evidence was greater than the weight of the nonqualifying evidence. Id.
135. See supra notes 128-134 (discussing Sanati and Strako).
136. Id.
137. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 440, 449-51.
138. See Weaver, supra note 95, at 591-95. The United States Supreme Court employs
several standards in considering whether to defer to an agency's interpretation. Id. at 591; see
e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980) (stating that courts should
defer to Reserve Board's interpretations in Federal Reserve Board action unless interpretation
is demonstrably irrational); Ehlert v. U.S., 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971) (stating that courts should
defer to reasonably, consistently applied agency interpretations); Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Serv. v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969) (stating that courts should defer to agency
interpretation unless agency interpretation is unreasonable or plainly erroneous).
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refer to a reasonableness standard.3 9 The reasonableness standard mandates
that a court should not substitute a judicial interpretation unless an agency does
not reasonably interpret an agency regulation.' 40 The United States Supreme
Court employed the reasonableness standard in Udall v. Tallman.141 In
Tallman, the Secretary of the Interior interpreted an Executive Order relating
to the disposition of public lands in Alaska. 42 The Secretary interpreted
part of the Order as withdrawing land that the Order covered from settle-
ment, location, sale, entry, or other disposition. 143 The Secretary determined
that the terms "settlement," "location," "sale" and "entry" all contem-
plated a transfer of title of the land in question.'" The Secretary, therefore,
interpreted the term "other disposition" to mean a passage of title to the
land. 45 The Secretary's interpretation left the land available for leasing.'
46
139. Weaver, supra note 95, at 595-97. Lower federal courts apply a number of different
standards in determining whether to defer to an agency interpretation of a regulation. Id. The
inconsistency in the lower courts regarding which deference standard to apply in a particular
case results in confusion when a court attempts to determine the appropriate standard. Id.
Courts at all levels of the federal judiciary often fail to apply any deference standard in favor
of other interpretive rules, thus increasing the confusion relating to which deference standard
to apply in a particular instance. Id. at 597-600. See, e.g., Northwest Central Pipeline Corp.
v. F.E.R.C., No. 84-1697, slip. op. at (10th Cir. August 5, 1986) (court may reverse
discretionary decision of agency only if decision was arbitrary or capricious); Deters v. Sec.
of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 789 F.2d 1181, 1184 (5th Cir. 1986) (courts should not substitute
interpretation if agency reading is not unreasonable); Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1149
(8th Cir. 1984) (courts should give due deference to agency's interpretation of agency's
regulation).
In Stapleton, Judge Sprouse cited Allen v. Bergland to support the contention that the
Fourth Circuit must seek to determine whether the agency consistently applied an interpretation.
Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 450; see Allen v. Bergland, 661 F.2d at 1001, 1004 (holding that
threshold question is whether agency interpretation is reasonable and consistently applied). In
Allen, the Fourth Circuit also considered the interpretation's reasonableness as an important
factor in deciding whether or not to defer to an agency. Allen, 661 F.2d at 1004.
140. See supra note 115 (stating that reigning confusion in courts on which deference
standard, if any, applies often leads courts to substitute incorrectly courts' own interpretation
for that of agencies').
141. 380 U.S. 1, rehg. denied., 380 U.S. 989 (1965).
142. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 1 (1965). The public lands in Udall v. Tallman fell
under Executive Order No. 8979 and Public Land Order No. 487. Tallman, 380 U.S. at 5;
Exec. Order No. 8979, 6 Fed. Reg. 6471 (1941); Public Land Order No. 487, 13 Fed. Reg.
3462 (1948), revoked by Public Land Order No. 1212, 20 Fed. Reg. 6795 (1955). Parallels
existing between regulations and Executive Orders allow application of Tallman principles to
cases involving administrative regulation interpretations. See BLACK's LAW DIcnONARY, 511,
1156-57 (noting similarity between Executive Orders and administrative regulations).
143. Tallman, 380 U.S. at 19.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id. (holding that no term in Order precluded renting land that Order affected).
The Tallman Court also noted that public land laws generally apply to the alienation of land
and not to the leasing of land. Id. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia implicitly held that the Order did not preclude the Secretary from leasing the lands.
Id. at 3. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the decision
of the district court, holding that the Order precluded the Secretary from leasing the land.
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The Tallman Court noted that there existed other reasonable interpretations
of the Order's language. 47 The Court, however, held that because the
Secretary's interpretation was reasonable, courts must defer to the Secre-
tary's interpretation.1
41
The agency in Tallman, unlike the D.O.L. in Stapleton, consistently
applied the challenged interpretation. 49 The Department of the Interior
made the agency interpretation of the Order a matter of public record." 0
People thus relied on the Department of Interior's interpretation in Tallman
to a greater degree than people relied on the previously unpublished Direc-
tor's interpretation in Stapleton.'5' The Supreme Court, however, has de-
ferred to unpublished interpretations. 52 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, should
not have rejected the Director's interpretation merely because the Director's
interpretation was not published or codified. 53
Udall v. Tallman, 324 F.2d 411, 404 (1963). The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals. Tallman, 380 U.S. at 4.
147. Tallman, 380 U.S. at 16. The Supreme Court in Tallman noted that the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that disposition of land included
leasing. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Secretary's prevailing interpretation was as
reasonable as the the Court of Appeals interpretation. Id. The Court, therefore, deferred to
the Secretary's interpretation because the interpretation was a reasonable construction of the
Orders. Id. The Tallman Court held that in order to defer to the agency interpretation a court
did not need to find that the agency interpretation was the only reasonable interpretation, .or
that the court would reach a similar interpretation. Id. Rather, the Court held that if an
agency interpretation is reasonable courts must defer to the agency interpretation. Id.
148. Id. at 4.
149. See id. (noting that agency interpretation was part of pulic record).
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text (noting difficulty in relying on
interpretations subject to change by agency); see also Tallman, 380 U.S. at 4 (public's
oppurtunity to know agency's position on meaning of Orders weighed heavily in Court's
decision to defer to agency interpetation). Although the Director's interpretation of section
727.203 was not a matter of public record, a reasonable assumption is that some miners may
have believed themselves incapable of establishing eligibility under the Director's interpretation
and thus, failed to file claims. Supra notes 99-107.
152. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969) (noting
that Court deferred to unpublished interpretation of deportation regulation); Thorpe v. Housing
Auth. of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 272 (1969) (upholding agency action based on
interpretation contained in circulars not yet incorporated into agency manual).
153. See Stanisic, 395 U.S. at 72 (noting that Court deferred to unpublished agency
interpretations); Thorpe, 393 U.S. 272 (decision based on unpublished agency interpretation).
In Stanisic, the Court deferred to an interpretation of a regulation by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS). Stanisic, 395 U.S. at 72. The Court found the interpretation
of INS dispositive because INS promulgated, administered and consistently applied the regu-
lation. Id. The Court found the INS interpretation controlling, as the interpretation was not
plainly erroneous. Id.
In Thorpe, the Court deferred to the agency's decision to base an action on a circular,
containing an interpretation of a regulation, that had not been physically added to the Agency's
manual. Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 275. Although incorporation into the manual was normal
procedure, the Court held that an agency decision to base an action on the new circular was
defensible and entitled to deference. Id. Finally, the Court decided that the language of the
circular was mandatory and clear, and, therefore, upheld agency action based on the circular.
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Judge Phillips' individual opinion did not refer explicitly to a reasona-
bleness standard in considering the Director's interpretation. 15 4 Courts' can-
not limit analyses of an interpretation under a reasonableness standard to
a review of the words of the regulation or statute in question.15  Judge
Phillips stated that, as a matter of law, the Fourth Circuit should have
deferred to the Director's interpretation unless the Director's interpretation
of section 727.203 was plainly erroneous or made section 727.203 incon-
sistent with the Act. 5 6 The standards of judicial review on which Judge
Phillips relied to ratify the Director's interpretation were factors in the
analysis of the overall reasonableness of section 727.203.157 Judge Sprouse
accepted Judge Phillips' characterization of the applicable deference stand-
ards.158 Judge Sprouse, however, maintained that an agency interpretation
first promulgated in a litigation brief did not rise to the level of an
interpretation to which the deference principle applies.5 9 Judge Sprouse,
therefore, would not defer to the Director's interpretation of section 727.203.
60
Nevertheless, Judge Sprouse analyzed the interpretation under the standards
of review that Judge Phillips set forth, concluding that the Director's
interpretation was plainly erroneous and also rendered section 727.203
inconsistent with the Act.'
61
The United States Supreme Court employed the plainly erroneous stand-
ard in Bowles v. Seminole Rock Company. 6 In Bowles, the Court reviewed
an administrative interpretation of a maximum price regulation.163 To com-
bat wartime inflation, the Office of Price Administration regulated the
prices of specified articles.'" The maximum price regulation provided that
154. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 440 (Judge Phillips expressly referred only to plainly
erroneous standard and to standard under which no deference is due interpretation that renders
regulation inconsistent with enabling statute).
155. See Tallman, 380 U.S. at 4, 19 (stating that when agency interpretation was reason-
able, and not clearly erroneous, courts must defer to interpretation); see also Weaver, supra
note 95, at 591-97 (citing confusion concerning applicable standards in deference cases); see
U.S. v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 (1977) (stating that regulations must be consistent with
enabling statute).
156. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 440. Judge Phillips discussed two standards of review of
agency interpretations of regulations referred to in the Stapleton opinion. Id. Judge Phillips
failed to distinguish between a plainly erroneous standard and an inconsistent with the regulation
standard of review. Id. Judge Phillips referred to the plainly erroneous standard and the
inconsistent with the regulation standard interchangeably. Id.
157. See id. at 440 n.2 (stating that courts should confine review of agency interpretations
to bounds of reasonableness to establish workable deference principles).
158. Id. at 449. Judge Sprouse would not defer to the Director's interpretation in Stapleton
because the Director submitted the interpretation in a brief as an intervenor. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id. (opinion of Judge Sprouse applying standards that Judge Phillips advocated
and finding that Fourth Circuit need not defer to Director's interpretation of § 727.203).
162. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
163. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 411 (1945).
164. See id. at 413 (regulation at issue in Bowles was part of larger regulatory scheme
designed to bring entire economy of nation under price control).
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the most that a seller could charge for regulated goods was the highest
price that the seller charged within a selected base period. 65 The adminis-
trator determined the allowable maximum price according to a regulated
scheme. 6 6 The Bowles decision focused on one of the ways in which the
agency calculated the highest price charged within the base period.' 67 The
agency interpreted the regulation to mean that the allowable maximum price
was the highest price charged for goods delivered within the base period,
even though the sale of the goods occurred earlier.'68 The defendant in
Bowles maintained that the regulation only referred to goods sold and
delivered during the base period.6 9 To resolve the dispute, the Court relied
on the plain words and relevant agency interpretation of the regulation . 7 0
The Court determined that unless the agency's interpretation was plainly
erroneous, the agency interpretation was the ultimate criterion upon which
a court based the meaning of the regulation.' 7 ' The Court, referring to the
regulatory language, found that the agency's interpretation of the regulation
was not plainly erroneous. 72 The Court, therefore, stated that the agency's
interpretation of the regulation prevailed over the defendant's interpreta-
tion.
73
Judge Phillips advocated application of the plainly erroneous standard
to the Director's interpretation of section 727.203.7 4 If the language of
section 727.203 lends no support to the Director's interpretation, the Direc-
tor's interpretation is plainly erroneous. 75 Section 727.203(a)(1) presumes
that pneumoconiosis totally disables a miner with at least 10 years of coal
mine employment if a chest x-ray establishes the existence of pneumocon-
iosis.176 Judge Sprouse argued in support of the per curiam holding regarding
subsection (a)(1).Y17 Judge Sprouse stated that if the drafters of the regulation
intended to require only one qualified x-ray to invoke the (a)(l) presumption,
there were few clearer ways to express that intent than to require the
165. See id. at 414-15 (regulation specified March 1942 as base period for determining
highest price seller could charge for regulated goods).
166. Id. at 414-15.
167. See id. (noting that regulatory scheme provided alternate methods for calculating
highest allowable price if circumstances precluded using method at issue in Bowles).
168. Id. at 414-15.
169. See id. at 415 (highlighting conflicting interpretations of price regulation).
170, See id. at 414 (holding that in choosing between varying interpretations of a
regulation, agency interpretations control unless interpretation is plainly erroneous).
171. Id. at 414.
172. Id. at 416.
173. Id. at 418,
174. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 440.
175. See Larionoff, 431 U.S. at 872-73 (holding regulations invalid if plainly erroneous);
Tallman, 380 U.S. at 16-17 (stating that agency interpretations of regulations are valid and
accorded great deference by courts unless plainly erroneous); Bowles, 325 U.S. at 413-14
(holding that courts owe no deference to plainly erroneous agency interpretations).
176. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(1) (1986); see supra note 11 and accompanying text (quoting
§ 727.203(a)(1)).
177. Stapleton, 785 F,2d at 453-54.
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presentation of "a" chest x-ray. 178 Moreover, the balance of the language
in section (a) of the regulation lends support to the theory that the regulation
requires only one qualifying piece of medical evidence to invoke the pre-
sumption.1 79 For example, the presumption under (a)(4) arises if the claimant
presents a physician's medical opinion that establishes the presence of a
totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment. 80 The language of
subsections 727.203(a)(1) and (a)(4) clearly requires an A.L.J. to invoke the
presumption if the claimant introduces one piece of qualifying medical
evidence."8"
The language of subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3), however, is not as clear
as the language contained in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(4) with regard to
how claimants may invoke the presumption. 82 Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3)
refer to ventilatory and blood gas studies that establish or demonstrate an
element necessary to establish eligibility for Black Lung Benefits.1 3 3 Under
subsection (a)(2), the ventilatory studies that a claimant presents must
establish the presence of a chronic respiratory disease.1 14 Under subsection
(a)(3), a claimant's blood gas studies must demonstrate the presence of an
oxygen transfer impairment. 85 Drafters of the regulation did not explain
what, if any, functional difference existed between the words "establish"
and "demonstrate."' 16 If the drafters intended to use demonstrate as a
synonym for establish, and to use establish synonymously with prove, the
language of section 727.203 would lend further support to Judge Phillips'
position on the invocation stage.8 7 The drafters of section 727.203 used
two different words in the language of subsections 727.203(a)(2) and (a)(3),
178. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that requiring a preponderance standard under subsection
(a)(l) would acknowledge the validity of intolerable drafting. Id.
179. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a) (1986); see supra note 11 and accompanying text (setting
forth § 727.203).
180. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(4)(1986).
181. 20 C.F.R. §§ 727.203(a)(1) and (a)(4) (1986). See supra notes 175-80 and accompa-
nying text (examining language of subsections 727.203(a)(1) and (a)(4)).
182. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(2) (1986); 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(3) (1986); see supra note
11 and accompanying text (setting forth text of subsections 727.203(a)(2) and (a)(3)).
183. See supra note 11 (quoting text of § 727.203).
184. See 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(2) (1986) (stating that claimants must produce test results
that establish eligibility according to table of ventilatory capacity values).
185. See 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(3) (1986) (stating that in order for claimant to obtain
benefits, claimant's blood gas study results must qualify under table of values attached to
subsection 727.203(a)(3)).
186. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d 445. In Stapleton, Judge Phillips noted the shift from use
of the word "establish" in (a)(2) to the word "demonstrate" in (a)(3). Id. Judge Phillips
attempted to highlight the futility of literally interpreting section 727.203 by noting several
syntactical errors. Id. Judge Phillips decided that Judges Hall and Sprouse erred in literally
interpreting the regulation. Id. Judge Phillips held that the word "a" in subsections (a)(1) and
(a)(4) meant that one piece of evidence may invoke the presumption. Id. Judge Phillips,
however, held that one piece of qualifying medical evidence does not raise automatically the
presumption. Id.
187. See id. at 439 (opinion of Judge Phillips),
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leaving ambiguous the intended operation of the two subsections."'
Judge Phillips, however, regarded the ambiguity in the language of
section 727.203 as insignificant.'8 9 Combining the use of the word "estab-
lish" in section 727.203 with the regulation's requirement to consider all
relevant evidence, Judge Phillips found the Director's interpretation most
consistent with the language of the regulation. 190 Use of the plurals in blood
gas studies and ventilatory studies bolstered the Director's argument.' 9' The
language of subsection (a)(2) and (a)(3) to some degree support a contention
that the D.O.L. contemplated that an A.L.J. would consider more than
just one qualifying ventilatory or blood gas study.' s9 The language of
subsection (a)(1) and (a)(4), however, conflicts with the position of Judge
Phillips regarding the language of subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3). 193 Subsections
(a)(1) and (a)(4) refer to introducing a single piece of medical evidence that
will give rise to the presumption. 94
Analyzing the totality of the language of section 727.203 gives more
meaningful support to the Director's interpretation. 95 Judge Phillips did
not show convincingly that the language of subsections (a)(1) and (a)(4)
supports the theory that claimants must invoke the presumption under a
preponderance of the evidence standard.'96 In contrast, Judge Sprouse
188. See Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414 (holding that when language of regulation is ambiguous,
courts must defer to agency interpretations unless plainly erroneous).
189. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 442 (Judge Phillips held that inability to discern intended
operation of presumption from only plain words of § 727.203 was inevitable because of
intellectual complexities involved with concept of presumptions in general).
190. Id. Judge Phillips held that the Director's interpretation set forth a proof scheme
that resolved the issues pertaining to all the factors in a black lung claim. Id. Judge Phillips
found no inconsistency between the Director's interpretation and section 727.203 that would
make the interpretation plainly erroneous. Id.
191. Id.; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 727.203(a)(2),(a)(3) (1986) (use of plurals in subsections (a)(2)
and (a)(3) supports Director's stance advocating preponderance standard in invocation stage
of § 727.203). Judge Phillips stated that Judge Hall's interpretation of §§ 727.203(a)(2) and
(a)(3) strained the plain meaning of the language in the subsections. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at
445 n.ll; see supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (Hall, J., holding that invoking
subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) required only one qualifying ventilatory or blood gas study, with
no preponderance standard). Judge Phillips held that use of plural objects in (a)(2) and (a)(3)
indicated a requirement to weigh all relevant evidence in the invocation stage. Stapleton, 785
F.2d at 445 & n.l1.
192. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Phillips' position on
invocation section).
193. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text (Sprouse, J., discussing language in
subsections (a)(1) and (a)(4)).
194. Id.
195. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 433-34 (Judge Hall analyzed the language of § 727.203).
Judge Hall stated that Judge Phillips opinion rendered superfluous the rebuttal phase of
section 727.203. Id. Judge Hall held that imposing a preponderance standard of proof in the
invocation stage rendered the presumptions irrebutable. Id.; see also id. at 447-48 (Phillips,
J., holding that employers may not rebut certain facts that claimant proved in invocation
stage).
196. Id. at 339 (opinion of Judge Phillips).
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presented a strong, although not dispositive, explanation of the language
of subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3). ' 97 Judge Sprouse decided that the language
of sulisections (a)(2) and (a)(3) fits into a scheme in which the claimant
bears only a burden of production in the invocation stage. 198 Judge Sprouse
realized, however, that although the Director's interpretation did not con-
stitute the only reasonable construction of the language of the regulation,
the Director's interpretation was not plainly erroneous. 99
If the Director's interpretation did not make section 727.203 inconsistent
with the Act, therefore, the Director's interpretation should have controlled
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Stapleton.20° In United States v. Larionoff,
20'
the United States Supreme Court refused to defer to an agency interpretation
of a regulation that the Court found made the regulation inconsistent with
the regulation's authorizing statute. 202 In Larionoff, the Court reviewed a
regulation regarding the establishment of eligibility criteria for re-enlistment
and duty extension bonuses for specially skilled military personnel. 2 3 The
Department of Defense regulation ordered the Navy to pay re-enlistment
and duty extension bonuses in accordance with the bonus amounts in effect
at the start of the new duty period. 204 The Supreme Court determined that
the regulation was inconsistent with the statute authorizing the regulation's
promulgation. 2 5 The legislative intent behind authorizing the bonuses was
to induce personnel with special skills to remain in the armed forces2 6 The
effectiveness of a bonus as an inducement to remain in the military depended
on a serviceman's ability to rely on the promise of a set amount at the
time of his decision to re-enlist or extend his duty.207 The Court, therefore,
197. See id. at 453-55 (Judge Sprouse's analysis of language in §§ 727.203 (a)(2), (a)(3)).
198. Id.
199. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 442. Judge Phillips stated that the Director's interpretation
was not the most common interpretation of the operation of the presumption because the
interpretation placed burdens of persuasion on both parties. Id. Judge Phillips, however, stated
that the Director's interpretation was not plainly erroneous because a presumption scheme that
placed burdens of persuasion on both parties was not uncommon. Id.
200. See id. at 440 (Judge Phillips held that even if not plainly erroneous, court owed no
deference to interpretation that rendered § 727.203 inconsistent with Act).
201. 431 U.S. 864 (1977).
202. Larionoff, 431 U.S. at 866.
203. Id. at 868.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 873. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Larionoff determined
that the legislative purpose in designating specially skilled servicemen was unambiguous. Id.
The Court held that the manifest purpose of the bonus program was to induce servicemen to
re-enlist or extend their service. Id. The Court held that the agency regulation was contrary
to the manifest purposes of Congress in enacting the bonus program. Id.
206. Id. at 877. The Supreme Court in Larionoff noted that prior to the new bonus
program, the military offered the same re-enlistment incentive to all personnel. Id. at 873.
The Defense Department wanted an incentive structure tailored to manpower requirements.
Id.
207. Id. at 876. The Supreme Court in Larionoff held that Congress intended that the
incentive operate at the time of a decision to re-enlist or to extend an enlistment. Id. The
19871
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
concluded that the eligibility criteria contained in the regulation applied
when the specially skilled serviceman made the decision to remain in the
military. 2°
In Larionoff, the Court recognized the relevance of analyzing legislative
history when choosing between two or more constructions of a regulation. 2°9
Following an initial period of D.O.L. Black Lung Benefits claims adjudi-
cation, Congress realized that the D.O.L.'s claims approval rate was far
below the approval rate of the Social Security Administration (S.S.A.).
210
With the 1978 Amendments, Congress authorized the D.O.L. to promulgate
eligibility criteria in order to eliminate the inequity between the S.S.A. and
the D.O.L. claims approval rates.211 Allowing the Director's interpretation
Supreme Court held that by determining bonuses at the time of the decision to re-enlist,
Congress intended that servicemen know how much money they would receive. Id. Under the
regulation at issue in Larionoff, the military could change the designation of specially skilled
personnel between the time of the decision to re-enlist and the beginning date of the new
service period. Id. The Court held that under the regulation, the bonus program did not
provide servicemen with an incentive to re-enlist. Id. The Court stated that there was no
incentive when a possibility existed that a serviceman's classification could change between the
decision to re-enlist and the beginning of the new service period, depending on the manpower
needs of the military. Id.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 873-77 (stating that servicemen must have some certainty about incentive
offered in order to effectuate clear intent of Congress).
210. See Solomons, supra note 6, at 877-95 (extensive discussion of legislative history of
§ 727.203 in context of motivation for implementation).
211. See id. at 877 (D.O.L.'s low approval rate significantly related to inability of D.O.L.
to use S.S.A. presumption); Drummond Coal Co. v. Freeman, 733 F.2d 1523, 1524 n.1 (11th
Cir. 1984) (discussing effect of low D.O.L. claims approval rate); see also Kilcullen, supra
note 30, at 71 (explaining how use of presumptions eases miner's burden of proving entitlement
to Black Lung Benefits). The major impetus for ratifying the 1978 Amendments was Congress'
desire to increase the number of Black Lung Benefits claims approvals. See Solomons, supra
note 6, at 877-95 (extensive discussion of legislative history in context of motivation for
implementation of § 727.203). The D.O.L. regulation is very similar to an S.S.A. regulation
that existed prior to section 727.203. See Solomons, supra note 6, at 874 (stating that Congress
sought to ensure that criteria that D.O.L. promulgated would erase inequity between S.S.A.
and D.O.L. claims adjudication); 884-95 (citing events preceding Congress' adopting § 727.203).
Before the 1978 Amendments authorized the D.O.L. to promulgate regulations, the D.O.L.
attempted to convince the S.S.A. to extend an existing S.S.A. presumption provision to D.O.L.
claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 410.490 (1986) (S.S.A. Black Lung Benefits presumption regulations).
The D.O.L. wanted to use the S.S.A. presumption to deal more quickly with the D.O.L.'s
backlog of claims. Solomons, supra note 6, at 884-85. The D.O.L. also desired to use the
S.S.A. presumtion standard as a tool to aid in responding to pressures to raise claims approval
rates. Solomons, supra note 6, at 884-85. Responding that the regulation was only an
administrative device to speed the processing of claims, the S.S.A. refused to grant the D.O.L.
requests. Solomons, supra note 6 at 885. Clearly, when Congress authorized the D.O.L. to
promulgate eligibility criteria no more restrictive than the S.S.A. criteria, Congress intended
for the D.O.L. to use the presumption in a fashion similar to the way in which the S.S.A.
used the presumption. See 30 U.S.C. § 902(0(2) (1982) (congressional mandate to D.O.L. to
make criteria no more restrictive than S.S.A. criteria); H.R. RP. No. 864, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 16, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ano. NEws 309-10 (stating Congress' mandate
concerning strictness of D.O.L. eligibility criteria); Freeman, 733 F.2d at 1524 n.l (discussing
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of section 727.203(a) to prevail would have contravened the express intent
of Congress in authorizing the promulgation of section 727.203.212 Exami-
nation of the legislative history, therefore, reveals that the Director's inter-
pretation rendered section 727.203 inconsistent with the Act.
213
The Fourth Circuit in Stapleton also considered allowing the use of
nonqualifying test results as evidence in rebuttal. 2 4 Judge Hall limited the
use of nonqualifying evidence in rebuttal. 215 Judge Phillips opposed any
exclusion of nonqualifying evidence. 2 6 Judge Phillips believed that disallow-
history of § 727.203); Solomons, supra note 6, at 884-95 (discussing congressional ratification
of D.O.L. presumption). The Director's interpretation may render the D.O.L. eligibility criteria
under section 727.203 more restrictive than the S.S.A. criteria. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 433
(Judge Hall stated that Congress mandated that D.O.L. dispose of claims after considering
all relevant evidence).
212. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 455 (Congress designed presumptions to modify burden
of proof on claimants and make establishing eligibility easier).
213. See infra notes 232-38 and accompanying text (explaining partial inconsistency of
Director's interpretation with § 727.203 of Act). The lack of Congressional debate concerning
the scientific validity of the presumption provides a partial rationale for the Director's
interpretations. See Solomons, supra note 6, at 885 (lack of congressional discussion regarding
rational relationship between medical criteria that claimants introduce and presumption that
pneumoconiosis caused total disability). The Director's interpretation may have been an attempt
to rectify what commentators view as an inability to justify medically the inferences that an
adjudicator may draw from the evidence that claimants introduce in Black Lung Benefits
cases. See Solomons, supra note 6 at 890-95 (describing expert testimony before Congress on
medical invalidity of S.S.A. interim presumption). Commentators criticized many aspects of
the S.S.A. presumption that served as the pattern for the D.O.L. presumption. See Solomons
supra note 6 at 888-91 (discussing various criticisms of section 727.203 by members of Congress
and medical community). For example, the medical community knows that as people age, the
normal ranges for results of ventilatory and blood gas studies change. See Solomons, supra
note 6, at 880-81 (noting that medical validity of section 727.203 was suspect). Section
727.203(a)(2) and (a)(3), however, make no allowance for age. 20 C.F.R. §§ 727.203(a)(2),
(a)(3) (1986); Solomons, supra note 6, at 880-81 (noting specific problem with regulation's
failure to compensate for age in assessing ventilatory and blood gas test results). An older
claimant whose ventilatory and blood gas study results are normal might invoke the presumption
because of the presumption's failure to compensate for age. Solomons, supra note 6, at 880-
81. Congress was aware of the possibility of weaknesses in the presumption and rebuttal
scheme of section 727.203. See Solomons, supra note 6 at 880-81 (explaining Congressional
debate regarding § 727.203). The legislature had many mechanisms with which to express
congressional dissatisfaction with the status quo. For instance, Congress could have amended
the Act, repealed the regulation, or expressly instructed the D.O.L. to interpret the regulation
in a particular manner. Congress instead did nothing to counteract earlier expressions of an
intent to make invoking the presumption and obtaining benefits relatively easy. See supra
notes 210-13 and accompanying text (describing clear legislative intent to reduce barriers to
claimants' establishing eligibility). Congress may have believed that requiring totally valid
presumptions would make eligibility more difficult to establish. See supra notes 6-15 and
accompanying text (Congress authorized promulgation of § 727.203 in order to increase claims
approval rates). A section 727.203 presumption is very easy to invoke under the interpretation
of the Fourth Circuit in Stapleton. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 426-27 (per curiam opinion).
214. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 427 (per curiam opinion).
215. Id. at 435; see supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Hall's
position, which partially excluded nonqualifying evidence in rebuttal).
216. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 445-46; see supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text (citing
Judge Phillips' holding to not exclude nonquafifying test results from consideration in rebuttal).
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ing the use of relevant nonqualifying evidence in the rebuttal stage could
lead to the award of benefits to undeserving claimants. 2 7 Judge Phillips
expressed concern regarding prohibiting an employer's use of relevant non-
qualifying evidence in the rebuttal stage.218 Totally disallowing the use of
nonqualifying test results in the rebuttal stage would place the Board or a
court in a position to facilitate a fraud.21 9 A claimant would encounter little
difficulty in obtaining a single piece of the required medical evidence
necessary to invoke the presumption regardless of the claimant's health. 220
If a court did not consider nonqualifying evidence, the court would further
a fraud by helping to insure that an employer has no means to rebut a
fraudulently invoked presumption.?' Judge Phillips' description of Judge
Hall's position on the use of nonqualifying evidence in rebuttal, however,
was not accurate. Judge Hall advocated upholding the decision of the
Fourth Circuit in Whicker.222 The Whicker decision clearly did not disallow
every use of nonqualifying test results in rebuttal. 3 By upholding Whicker,
Judge Hall affirmed the position that employers may not rely principally
on nonqualifying test results in rebuttal. 224 Judge Hall cited Whicker as
support for the proposition that nonqualifying test results are admissible22
and especially probative when physicians use the results as documentation
for a reasoned medical opinion?.2 6 A physician may use nonqualifying test
results as part of a total assessment of a claimant's disability. 227 The Whicker
217. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 445-46 (Phillips, J., stating that any exclusion of nonqualifying
evidence may prevent employers' from presenting most trustworthy medical evidence of actual
nature of claimants' respiratory or pulmonary impairment).
218. See id. (Judge Phillips criticizing the opinion of Judge Hall). Since Judge Hall's
reasoning would exclude medical evidence bearing on either causation or disability unrelated
to claimant's employment, undeserving claimants may recover benefits. Id.
219. Id. at 446. Judge Phillips held that any rule disallowing the use of nonqualifying
evidence mistakenly limits the use of relevant evidence in disproving a presumed fact. Id.
220. Id.; see Solomons, supra note 6, at 877-94 (stating that presumption is medically
unjustifiable).
221. See generally Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 447 (Judge Phillips discussed effect of Judge
Hall's position on the use of nonqualifying evidence in the rebuttal stage).
222. Id. at 436; see supra note 70 (discussing holding in Whicker).
223. Whicker, 733 F.2d at 349 (nonqualifying test results may be used in rebuttal except
when used as exclusive means of rebutting presumption); See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 436 (Judge
Hall stated that to allow use of nonqualifying evidence as principal means of rebuttal would
contradict language and purpose of § 727.203); see also Whicker v. U.S. Dept. of Labor
Benefits Review Bd., 733 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1984) (employers may not rely solely on
nonquaifying test results in rebuttal); Hampton v. U.S. Dept. of Labor Benefits Review Bd.,
678 F.2d 506, 508 (4th Cir. 1982) (Fourth Circuit held that employers may not rely exclusively
on nonqualifying evidence to rebut presumption).
224. See Whicker, 733 F.2d at 349 (stating that A.L.J. may deny benefits if claimant is
able to do mine work and that A.L.J. may consider nonquaifying evidence).
225. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 436; see Whicker, 733 F.2d at 348 (Fourth Circuit rejected
A.L.J. decision that employer rebutted presumption because of A.L.J.'s heavy reliance on
nonqualifying results).
226. Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 436.
227. See id. (opinion of Judge Hall allowing adjudicators to consider nonqualifying test
results if not used as only means of rebuttal).
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scheme allows consideration of nonqualifying test results in rebuttal and
only disallows rebuttal based principally on nonqualifying test results.228
Whicker reflected congressional intent to make establishing eligibility for
benefits less difficult for claimants.229 The Whicker rule also recognized the
possible relevance of nonqualifying test results.? 0 By allowing unrestricted
consideration of all relevant nonqualifying test results, the Fourth Circuit
in Stapleton contravened congressional intent by making the presumption
easier to rebut.'
The Whicker rule protects against requiring a claimant to present proof
of pneumoconiosis by two or more testing methods before deriving any
benefit from the presumption.?2  For example, if a claimant invokes the
presumption under section 727.203(a)(l), the claimant raises a presumption
that he suffers from pneumoconiosis and the adjudicator presumes also that
the disease totally disables the claimant.?3 If nonqualifying x-rays are
admissible to show in rebuttal that the claimant does not have pneumocon-
iosis, the presumption of total disability would disappear. 4 Allowing un-
restricted use of nonqualifying evidence in rebuttal, therefore, counteracts
the intended evidentiary burdens of section 727.203.235 If employers are able
to make a successful rebuttal based solely on nonqualifying evidence,
employers easily may deprive claimants of any of the intended advantage
that the presumption provides.? 6 In Stapleton, the Fourth Circuit lessened
an employer's burden of disproving a claimant's entitlement to benefits.
7
Now, rather than defeating a claim by rebutting the presumption, an
228. See Whicker, 733 F.2d at 348 (Fourth Circuit holding that allowing rebuttal based
principally on nonqualifying test results would place a burden on claimants that is totally
incompatible with language and purposes of regulation).
229. See id. (holding that Congress intended to make establishing eligibility less difficult);
supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text (examining legislative intent underlying authorization
of § 727.203).
230. See Whicker, 733 F.2d at 349 (disallowing rebuttal based primarily on nonqualifying
evidence); Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 436 (Judge Hall, writing for majority, held that nonqualifying
test results are relevant to rebuttal when used as documentation for examining physician's
diagnosis).
231. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 455 (Congress designed presumption to shift burden of
proof to make establishing eligibility less difficult; Judge Sprouse held that Judge Phillips'
interpretation of § 727.203 has effect opposite of that which Congress intended).
232. See Whicker, 733 F.2d at 348 (noting that A.L.J.'s reliance on principally nonqual-
ifying test results forced claimant to prove existence of pneumoconiosis by at least two of the
accepted techniques codified in §§ 727.203(a)(1)-(a)(4)).
233. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 436, 461-64 (opinions of Judges Sprouse and Hall on
admissibility of nonqualifying evidence in rebuttal).
234. Id.
235. See id. at 455 (Judge Sprouse finding that views of Justice Phillips counteract intent
underlying § 727.203 by forcing claimant to prove in invocation stage facts that Congress
intended only to be presumed).
236. See id. (holding that allowing rebuttal based solely on nonqualifying evidence renders
establishing eligibility more difficult, counteracting congressional intent to make establishing
benefit entitlement easier).
237. Id. at 436.
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employer need only prove that the adjudicator incorrectly invoked the
presumption." 8
In Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Company, the Fourth Circuit des-
ignated the type and quantum of proof required to invoke and rebut the
presumption under the criteria enumerated in section 727.203.29 To invoke
the presumption, a Black Lung Benefits claimant need present only one
piece of medical evidence of the type that subsections (a)(l)-(a)(4) specify.
240
Once a claimant invokes the presumption, the burden of persuasion falls
upon opponents of the claim to disprove by a preponderance of the evidence
the claimant's right to benefits .241 The Fourth Circuit's per curiam opinion
rejected the agency's claim that the regulation required claimants to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to invoke the
238. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 448 (Judge Phillips holding that after claimant invokes
presumption, burden is on employer to disprove any element rebuttably presumed). A majority
of the Fourth Circuit adopted a position on the use of nonqualifying test results in rebuttal
that is contrary to the Director's. Id. See Brief for the Director, Office of Workers' Compen-
sation Programs at 25-28, Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 785 F.2d 424 (4th cir.
1986)(Director agreed that employer may not rely principally on nonqualifying evidence to
rebut, and recognized that nonqualifying test results are admissible and probative when claimant
used results as documentation for opinion of physician). In contrast to the Fourth Circuit in
Stapleton, the Director expressly affirmed the Whicker decision regarding use of nonqualifying
test results in rebuttal. Brief for the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs at
28, Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 785 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1986); See also Stapleton,
785 F.2d at 461-64 (4th Cir. 1986) (Judge Sprouse, noting that Judge Phillips based position
regarding subsection (a) on deference to Director's interpretation and took position regarding
subsection (b) that is contrary to Director's interpretation). The Director expressly held, as did
Judges Hall and Sprouse, that nonqualifying test results, standing alone, cannot rebut a
presumption. See Brief for the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs at 25-
28, Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 785 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1986)(indicating that
nonqualifying test results alone are insufficient evidence on which to base rebuttal). The
Director also stated that nonqualifying evidence is relevant to rebutting a presumption as part
of a physician's reasoned medical opinion. Brief for the Director, Office of Workers' Com-
pensation Programs at 25-28, Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 785 F.2d 424 (4th Cir.
1986). Judge Phillips, therefore, engaged in judicial interpretation in expressing an opinion on
the allowable use of nonqualifying test results in rebuttal, despite protesting against the very
same type of judicial interpretation throughout the opinion. See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 446-
47 (setting forth Judge Phillips' view of allowable use of nonqualifying evidence in rebuttal
stage); Brief for the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs at 25-28, Stapleton
v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 785 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1986) supra note 120, at 25-28 (holding
that employers may not rely exclusively on nonqualifying evidence to rebut a presumption).
Judge Phillips inexplicably renounced the theory of judicial deference to the Director's
interpretation regarding the operation of section 727.203(b). Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 446-47.
Judge Phillips' position regarding section 727.203(b), therefore, dilutes to a great extent the
persuasiveness of the deference argument regarding section 727.203(a). Stapleton, 785 F.2d at
446-47.
239. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text (per curiam decision of Fourth Circuit).
240. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (court's decision on quantum of proof
required to invoke presumption under §§ 727.203(a)(l)-(a)(4)).
241. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit holding that burden of
proof shifted to employer once claimant invokes presumption).
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